The Universal Human Rights and The Islamic Regime of Iran by hassaniyan, allan et al.
Standard Front Page for Projects and Master Theses  
Compulsory use for all projects and Master Theses on the following subjects:  
 International Develoment Studies  
 Global Studies  
 Erasmus Mundus, Global Studies – A European Perspective 
 Public Administration 
 Social Science 
 EU-studies 
 Public Administration, MPA 
User’s manual on the next page.  
Project title:  
The Universal Human Rights and The Islamic Regime of Iran 
Project seminar 
Global Politics, Global Governance, Regionalisation and State Sovereignty  
Prepared by (Name(s) and study number):  Kind of project: Module: 
Allan Hassaniyan (42531)  
 
 
Project GS-K2 
Alireza Khalili (51238) Project GS-K2 
Manju Ghimire (50303) 
Project GS-K3 
Name of Supervisor:  
Michelle Pace 
Submission date:  
24.05.2014 
Number of keystrokes incl. spaces (Please look at the next page): 
171755 
Permitted number of keystrokes incl. spaces cf. Supplementary Provisions (Please look at 
the next page): 
180000 
 
 
The Universal Human Rights and The Islamic Regime of Iran  
 
 
 
Roskilde University 
Global Studies, Master Program 
Spring of 2014 
Master project formed by: 
Allan Hassaniyan 
Alireza Khalili 
Manju Ghimire 
 
Supervisor: Michelle Pace 
 
Written by: 
Allan Hassaniyan 
Alireza Khalili 
Manju Ghimire 
 
 
 
Roskilde University  
Spring of 2014 
Universitetsvej 1  
4000 Roskilde  
Department of Society and Globalization (ISG) 
 
Table of Notions  
Farsi/Arabic English 
Al-wilaya al-mutlaqa The Jurisconsult’s 
Artesh The Armed Forces 
Basij A Voluntary Paramilitary Militia  
Bonyads Political-Religious Organizations Established 
by the IRI  
Diya  Blood-money 
 
Eid-e- Fitr 
Feast of Breaking the Fast, one of the most 
important religious ceremony celebrated by 
Muslims (Ramadhan) 
 Ensan-e kamel Perfect human 
Īrānīyat To Be Iranian 
 IRGC The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
Islāmīyat Islam and the related issues 
Mashru‘iyyat-I ilahi-ye mardom Divine-democratic Sovereignty 
Messiha Emancipator –Liberation (of Jewish from 
Slavery)  
Mujahidin (e-khalq-e- Iran) The leftist organization that was active in 
1979 Revolution of Iran.  
  
Mullah 
Clergyman: a title for person with broad 
knowledge in Islamic sacred law 
Nezam’ Muqadas-e Jomhuri-e  Islami The Sacred Regime of Islamic Republic 
Nourouz  The Iranian New Year 
Qisas  Retaliation 
Qurban Eid Festival of the Sacrifice celebrated by 
Muslims every year 
Sepah (Sepah e- Pāsdārān-e Enqelāb-e Eslāmi)  Army of The Guardians of the IRI 
Shari’a 
 
Islamic law – Islamic jurisprudence 
 
Shi’a 
 
The main Islamic sect in Iran. 
Sunni The Largest Islamic sect in the world. 
Toda The Communist Party of Iran 
Ummah Nation or Community of Muslims 
Velayat-e faqih  The Guardian Jurist – The supreme Leader 
 
  
 
 
 
'Who can bad-mouth human rights… It is beyond partisanship and 
beyond attack.”   (Mazower 2004:379) 
 
 
 
Abstract  
It seems that, the degree of adaptation and implementation of human 
rights values has turned to be the corner stone for evaluation of state in 
a globalizing world. Although in every corner of the world raise the 
voices of individuals and minorities in glorification of the human rights, 
but still exist some regimes that resist accepting these global standards 
of human rights. We are concern to see how the IRI –as a theocratic 
regime with the pervasive human rights- is challenged in adapting and 
implementing these values. It is a complicated case, because the regime 
receives its legitimacy from practice of Islamic rules and values. 
Acceptance of the human rights as a secular product of human being is 
in sharp contrast with celestial law of Islam. Moreover, adaptation of 
these rights might jeopardize the regime’s internal legitimacy, and 
ignoring the rights also costs the regime decline of international 
respect. Hence, the project aims to investigate the challenges of the IRI 
in adapting and implementing these values. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Problem field 
The post- revolution Iran has been regarded as a regional power, with a geo -strategic 
position. Iran has more than 77 million people, with various ethnicities and religions, 
and possesses a great military and economic capability in the Middle East/Persian Gulf. 
After the abolishment of the Pahlavi Imperial regime in 1979 its constitution was 
revised based on parliamentary democracy and religion, with supervision of elected 
clergymen. The Supreme Leader- now Ayatollah Ali Khamenei- administers the general 
policies of the state. Although Iran is a republic state and the president- as the head of 
the state- is elected through votes of inhabitants, it seems that he is not able to make 
contentious decisions independently- both in internal and international policies. All 
decisions and policies need to comply with the regime’s structure and to be admitted by 
parliament, the Guardian Council of Constitution, and notably by the Supreme Leader 
(Banuazizi 1995).  
A confluence of challenges has since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
(IRI) in 1979 –among them the Green Movement and some national political riots 
emerged in six months of tumultuous protests after the disputed 2009 presidential 
election, Iran’s nuclear program and its tension with the international society, U.N. 
sanctions since 2006 due to Iran’s lack of cooperation with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) –faced the regime. These might be understood as result of 
globalization and changes in international as well as government-citizens relations in 
Iran (Wright 2014). 
Furthermore, IRI is one of the states that have been criticized by UN agents for its 
substandard human rights condition (UNHR 2014). Its reluctance in adapting and 
implementing the universal human rights values and violation of them in Iran are the 
current issues that have challenged legitimacy of the regime- as it deficits the values of 
good governance. In the globalizing era, whilst the Human Rights Organizations 
emphasize on the rules and values with secular substance –stressing equal individual 
rights regardless of race, gender, language, etc –the Islamic regime of Iran emphasizes 
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on practice of religious values and reproduction of the values that have roots in the 
Islamic Revolution –for example establishing a society based on the concept of ‘Islamic 
Ummah’(Holliday 2007:77). As it seems the IRI has less attention to the Human Rights’ 
declarations on social, political, and cultural conditions. 
The United Nations High Commission for Human Rights (UNHR) in its annual reports for 
the situation of human rights in Iran assesses that there continues to be widespread 
systematic violations of human rights in Iran; 
“…human rights violations have continued to be committed in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. Such violations have continued and intensified, particularly in the case of human 
rights defenders, women’s rights activists, journalists and Government opponents. 
Concerns about torture, amputations, arbitrary detention and unfair trials continue to 
be raised by United Nations human rights mechanisms”(UNHR 2011:3 & UNHR 2013). 
 
Institutional power composition and the governing structure of the Iranian regime have 
created a contradictory political system. Political authority in the IRI, since its 
establishment, has been divided between different and competing centers of power. A 
duality of power mechanism outshines the Iranian political system. The structure may 
be depicted as following; on one side the Spiritual Leader and the Guardian Council were 
created and empowered with the ultimate authority over national affairs (political 
organs not elected by the people), and on the other side the president, the parliament 
and the municipal councils, elected through votes of inhabitants. However, there have 
been contradictory policies and performances among the said institutions (Takeyh 
2003:43). 
A multi-chamber power institution –which in many situations contradicts and opposes 
each other –and a constitution by roots in Islamic Shari'a and impenetrable theocracy 
have had challenged political reformation and made in adapting universal human rights 
values and other good governance values in Iran impossible. A so - called Islamic human 
rights perspective hold by some Islamic countries, among them Iran contradicts the 
universal human rights values (Thaler 2010). In an Islamic human right perspective:  
“[the] human rights are understood in terms of moralities and their worldly nature, 
many differences can be identified between the perspective that holds human rights as 
universal and the Islamic perspective that has its roots in religion. In general, Islam 
promises a society of believers in which peace and correlation is possible. An individual 
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is just one, among many believers, who can achieve his entitled rights though Islamic 
laws and values” (Davoodifard 2011:129). 
 
International Organizations –such as UNHR, Amnesty International and Human Rights 
watch –play important roles in the contemporary world system as they have great 
impacts on the states’ national and international policies, as well as the social lives of 
individuals. The Human Rights Organizations’ activities encompass different fields: civil, 
political, social, economic and cultural; the most controversial engagements of human 
rights are cultural and political, due to the challenges might be caused against the states. 
Although it is not possible to ignore the positive gains and humanitarian concerns of the 
Human Rights Organizations, some of the activities might be regarded as threats to the 
sovereignties of traditionalist regimes. In this regard IRI’s anxiety mostly concerns 
about Islamic values, which might be challenged by the human rights values 
(Davoodifard 2011:136).  
 
1.2 Research question  
In this project we assume the challenges IRI has with the activities of Human Rights 
Organizations in order to improve Iranians’ human rights condition- and accordingly, we 
attempt to explore the following research question: 
“What are the challenges of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a theocratic regime, in 
adapting and implementing universal human rights values?”  
1.3 Sub-questions 
1. How does Theocracy as a political system in contemporary Iran achieve its 
legitimacy? 
2. How could policies of superpowers –as advocators of universal human rights –
towards human rights situation in Iran be justified?  
3. How is the policy of IRI toward adapting the human rights values in Islamic 
constitution?  
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
 The purpose of this chapter is to describe what methodological approach we use in this 
project, and it provides a proper structure for the project; introduces the used empirical 
data and sources, and it provides a section in which we describe the theoretical approach 
we use in the project. 
 
2.1 Project structure and design 
Project design:  
 
 
Figure 1: Own creation2014 
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Structurally, the project is organized in five main chapters: Introduction, Methodology, 
Analysis, Discussion and Conclusion. Following is a brief description for the content of 
each chapter. 
 
Description of Project's Structure 
Introduction 
The first chapter introduces the already stated problem field. Our Problem-formulation 
and the differentiated sub research questions are embedded in this chapter.   
 
Methodology  
The second chapter depicts the employed methodological approach in this project. In this 
chapter we cover sub-sections, summary of the main theories we used in the project, and 
the degree of validity and reliability of the used empirical data.  
 
Analysis 
The third chapter is the Analysis. The Analysis chapter consists of three main sections. 
Each section includes some sub-sections. The first section addresses political structures 
of IRI, and the state’s policies and legitimacy. The second analytical section  includes a 
critical view on the roles and politics of democratic 1 superpowers toward human rights. 
The third and final analytical section consists of universality and relativity of human 
rights values, human rights and cultural relativism, Islam and human rights and Iran and 
the rights of the citizens. 
 Each analytical section –in some aspects –includes the historical review of ideologies, 
events, rules and values that allows us to understand and analyze the present arguing 
concepts and problems.   
Discussion, Conclusion and Perspective  
The Discussion chapter is based on the analysis and our understanding of the case. In the 
Conclusion, we provide an answer to our research-questions. Finally, in the further 
                                                                 
1
 In this project we refer to democracy with the global and Western standard values   
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perspectives, we propose possible issues about human rights that can be probed by the 
future projects.  
2.2 Method and Empirical Data 
The methodological and empirical sections reflect the analysis of our empirical data. 
Understanding Islam’s perception of human rights; argument for opposing univer sal 
human rights values in the shade of interpretation of Shari’a in Iran -as a political 
instrument- are the main objectives in writing this project. Being familiar with the social 
and political context and structures of Iran and considering the standard norms of the 
human rights –to be said the Western one –we try to argue why and how the regime 
denial of acceptance, adaptation and implementation of these standards in society of 
Iran. Another angle of the project puts focus on how democratic superpowers –in terms 
of human rights –challenge the sovereignty of the IRI.  Considering the human rights 
values we hypothesize that the situation of social and political rights of people in Iran is 
not satisfactory. 
 
Furthermore, this project addresses the situation of human rights in IRI during almost 
four decades governing of the regime. Based on our study we assume that any significant 
change in improvement of the social and political rights in Iran has not taken place; it 
seems that the regime still has the same conservative political structure. Considering 
legitimization of the regime’s policies, the IRI’s elite’ arguments are still based on the 
same norms and values from its early foundation as the IRI denies and opposes 
implementing universal human rights. In this regard, it seems that the degree of 
violation of human rights in the history of IRI could be high. The IRI is still among those 
regimes where the rights of minorities and women’s rights have been violated  
(Freedomhouse 2013). Since in the globalizing world good governance is distinguished 
and defined by specific democratic standards such as respecting individuals’ free will, 
traditional concept of legitimacy is challenged. The traditional regimes govern based on 
old ideologies that are community based and not individual based. The policies of the IRI 
as an Islamic regime are based on the Shi’i doctrine of Imamate. Also as doctrine that : 
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“…is a fundamental core belief of the Shi’a which separates them from other 
mainstream Muslims [for Instance Sunni Muslims]… Mainstream Shi’a Imamate (12er 
Shi’a) hinges on the understanding that apart from the Prophets and Messengers of 
God, there exist 12 divinely appointed men called 'Imams' who originate from the 
direct lineage of the Prophet's daughter Fatima and cousin / son-in-law Ali ibn Abi 
Talib (Ali)”( Islam 2012:1). 
 
So far –based on the above assumptions –our focus in this project is to understand the 
IRI’s policies toward human rights as well as IRI’s considerations of human rights. We 
also seek to find out if adaptation and implementation of human rights values may affect 
sovereignty of the state and ideologies of the regime. 
 
Mainly, the empirical data for this project is based on secondary sources, articles, 
reports, academic journals and primarily done research work subjected to the term 
‘human rights’ and the human rights state in the case of Iran. The empirical data and 
material used in our analysis mainly deal with the period of IRI’s governance. However, 
for better understanding of some concepts and events we refer to historical periods such 
as pre-IRI and pre-Islamic Iran. In the analytical section we refer to the report on the 
situation of human rights in the IRI by the UN’s Special rapporteur, Ahmed Shaheed and 
the regime’s articulations presented on the IRI’s website of human rights2. The report 
does not point out all of the violations of human rights in Iran, but accordingly it 
represents an overview of the human rights condition. Moreover, we use the justification 
of the regime about human rights presented mainly in the articles published on the IRI 
human rights website. We try to provide both sides of the argument to present a better 
picture of the human rights situation in Iran. 
 
Limitation 
We are aware that ‘human rights’ encompasses different fields and it is not possible to 
deal with all in our project. In this regard we take in to consideration to focus on the 
social and political rights of the people that are tangible in case of Iran. 
                                                                 
2 http://humanrights-iran.ir   (accessed from 20.3. 2014 till 25.4.2014)  
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Furthermore, gathering data based on conducting interview was not possible for us, due 
to our limitation in contacting the representative authorities of IRI as well as the UN 
agency in charge with the human rights situation in Iran. Therefore we decided to focus 
on secondary data –mainly academic articles.    
 
2.2.1 Inductive Case Study  
The state of human rights in Iran is the case of this study. Empirical-inductive study is the 
methodical approach employed in this project. An empirical-inductive study in general is 
a method that can be employed in regard to provide hypothesis and theories. This 
approach gives us the possibility to discover new hypotheses and employ different 
theories to have a better understanding of the case. As a result these hypotheses and 
theories can be used to make further predictions or explanations (Bryman 2008:52ff). 
The analysis will be led by collected available empirical data and not by theoretical 
notions. Therefore, to understand different dimensions of the study, it is important to 
have a robust research design included by relevant collected data in a meaningful way to 
the initial question of the study (Yin 2003:19). As mentioned before, IRI is the case study 
of this project. Applying a case study allows us, to maintain the holistic and meaningful 
characteristics of real situation, which follows the notions of a logical analysis and 
theoretical generalization. This approach allows us for not applying one generalized 
theory and selected representative empirical data. But, instead of using one main theory 
to explain why the IRI oppose and reacts to term ‘the universal human rights’, we use 
‘middle range theories’ (Yin 2003: 2 and Merton 1968). By allying different theoretical 
notions to the empirical data, we search for proper answers to the formulated problem.  
 
2.2.2 Relevance, Validity and Reliability 
This section touches the criteria of relevance, validity and reliability of the empirical data 
used in the three analytical sections. We have taken to account these three main criteria 
during the process of collecting the empirical data. 
The question of representativeness –by using secondary data –needs to be taken to 
account. Regarding the criteria of representativeness, the arguments of the IRI and its 
critics are included. For instance, in choosing articles and reports about the situation of 
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human rights in Iran, the UNHR documents and the documents articulated at the IRI’s 
website of human rights have been included. Furthermore, these documents and articles 
deal with different subjects of human rights. During the process of project writing we 
tried to reflect different views and opinions, so the project can give the reader the 
opportunity to follow the political development in IRI from the very beginning until 
recent time. 
Regarding the term validity, we believe that the used documents, particularly the UN’s 
declarations are adequately valid and reliable that cover both sides of the argument: a 
part of these documents have critical view on IRI’s way of dealing with human rights in 
Iran and some of the documents deal with arguments on the human rights values and the 
Human Rights Organizations activities.  
Literature review 
This sub-section is a brief literature review of the materials and sources that have been 
included in this project. The project, in the Analysis and Discussion chapters, employs 
theoretical texts, academic articles etc. Following is a review and core content of the 
mainly used texts in the project. 
UNHR’s reports on the situation of human rights in the contemporary IRI: these reports 
address both the evolution and decline of the human rights situation in IRI. They have 
mapped out different challenges in the IRI’s adaption and implementation of human 
rights values. What these reports have to common is that they particularly are criticizing 
the IRI’s management of the human rights issues in Iran.   
Davoodifard (2011), Afshari (2001) and IHRDC (2014) articles are some of those 
sources that explain the articulation of the term human rights in Iran. They discuss how 
the debate of human rights in Iran is as ongoing struggle between IRI and the Iranian 
people: for instance they concern the debate of women rights and the freedom of media 
(Internet) and regime’s policy for these areas. They introduce some evidence related to 
the vulnerability of IRI as result of the emergence of new human rights movement in 
Iran.  Furthermore, these scholars and sources mention different degrees of 
improvement of human rights situation in Iran.   
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Following soclares; Akbarzadeh &MacQueen (2008), Amuzegar (2003), Bielefeldt 
(2000), Bressler (2007) and Chehabi (1991) have provided us the core data (theoretical 
as well as empirical) that have been employed in regard to the Iran’s Islamic theo cratic 
regime’s conceptualization of the human rights and its arguments for rejecting these 
values. Moreover, articles of these scholars have provided us with a historical 
background for the Islamic Shi’i and clergymen’s involvement in the political system  in 
Iran.     
Skocpol (1982), Zewde (2009) and Panah (2002) have contributed to our understanding 
on the emergence of the Iranian Revolution in 1979. They focus on the structural 
challenges that caused Iranians dissatisfaction during the period of the Pahlavi; 
moreover, they discuss different political groups’ purpose and contribution to the 
emergence of the Revolution. Furthermore, they, in their articles address social and 
political change (resulted from revolution) in the post-revolution state period –
particularly in the case of the 1979 Revolution.  
Holliday (2007 and 2011) articles are among those core data that are used in regard to 
explain the Iranian national identity, what it means to be Iranian and how the Iranian 
identity has been constructed and reconstructed during the last century. She explains 
that Iranian cultural and national identity –especially during the last century –has been 
formed and reformed by different government –depend on different interests and socie-
political contexts.    
Donnelly (2007), Manokha (2009), Mazower (2004), Gilley (2006), Ong (2006), 
Pollmann (2005) and Rehhman  & Breau (2007) have been employed in regard to 
gaining theoretical understanding of state legitimacy, the universal and the Islamic 
human rights, citizenship and the rights of citizens, and role of superpower in 
advocating and improving the human rights. These sources are enriched with theoretical 
concept. They helped us in mapping the political structure of IRI and why –for example 
Islamic values contradict with the universal values of human rights. 
 2.3 Theoretical Approaches  
This section provides the applied theoretical notions in analyzing the empirical data.  
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In the following section we will provide a brief introduction of those theoretical notions 
that have been used in the analysis chapter. Because of the muti -dimensionality of the 
analysis one major theory could not provide proper understanding of the situation of 
human rights in Iran. In this regard the analysis using different theories gives us the 
opportunity to look at data from different perspectives and to get a better 
comprehension of the situation. 
 
State’s Legitimacy 
The concept ‘state’s Legitimacy’ –as a central issue in social and political theory –is the 
main theoretical term employed in the first analytical section. State’s legitimacy deals 
with different factors and elements such as constitution, politicians, judges, nation, and 
law. In the first section of the Analysis chapter we focus on the regime’s legitimacy in 
Iran.  
The power legitimacy shows that the ruling regimes should be elected by people and 
they should rule based on the people’s desires and beliefs. Therefore, regimes get 
permission to rule from the nation. So the governance is a contract between people and 
the government, which expires if the regime turns to be autocrat or oppress the nation. 
In this project the Bruce Gilley understandings of the state and regime’s legitimacy will 
be employed. According to Bruce Gilley (2006) there are different sources for state 
through which it can achieve its legitimacy: the performance of government, considering 
the people’s shared beliefs, ruling based on justice and equality of citizens’ rights and 
international communities’ respect for regime are the main ones (Bellina et fl.2009). 
National legitimacy shows the relationship between a state and its citizens. If people are 
satisfied with the performance of the regime and the people accept the government’s 
decisions eagerly and with satisfaction, the regime has secured its national legitimacy.  
By employing the term legitimacy we attempt to gain a better understanding of the 
source of the IRI’s national legitimacy as well as international respect. The picture of how 
and to what degree the regime has gained legitimacy in Iran indicates the people’s 
satisfaction with their social and political rights in Iran.   
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Clash of Civilizations 
In the first analytical section we employ Samuel P. Huntington's arguments on the 
universality of human rights values and the importance of them in international relations 
after Cold War. Huntington claims that post Cold War period has outshined by cultural 
and ideological confrontation between Western and non-Western civilization 
(Huntington 1993:29). Furthermore, he asserts that in a power struggle among states 
and the West and non-West, the concept of human rights have been employed by the 
Western powers as an instrument for achieving their interests in the so called third 
world countries. Therefore, he questions the universality of human rights values.  
The theory differentiates between non-Western civilizations rather than grouping them 
together. He also explains how the West presents the Western policies positive for  the 
entire world. This he argues why some of the Western values like human rights often are 
the least important values to other civilizations.  
 
Deconstruction theory  
As we mentioned in problem field, we consider Iran as a theocratic regime that acts as a  
transcendental signified due to its emphasis on Islamic truth and rejecting un -Islamic 
values and realities as even if they are demands of majority of people. We assume that 
presence of equal rights in the society and adaptation of the human rights values  in the 
constitution instead of solid Islamic law will weaken the Islamic-cultural values and give 
voice to the marginalized. Therefore, we assume the human rights adaptation might be 
seen as a deconstruction of theocratic political system. Conceptualizing the Derridean 
theory of deconstruction, we used concepts of transcendental signified, logocenterism, 
binary Oppositions and différance. Deconstruction asserts, “a text has an almost infinite 
number of possible interpretations” … [that] are just as creative and important as the text 
or texts being interpreted” (as quoted in Bressler 2007:116-17), Derrida considers 
signification arbitrary and conventional. In this regards, transcendental signified 
provides “an ultimate meaning because it would be the origin of origins, reflecting itself 
and, as Derrida says, providing the reassuring end to the reference from sign to sign ” 
(Ibid:120) So it functions as the center of meaning based on which people construct their 
realities around such ‘centers and truth’ that is unquestionable. This longing for a center 
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is called logocenterism. Due to system of binary operations, establishment of an absolute 
center means the decentering of another. So, one element will always be superior (Words 
of God and man) and the other inferior (decision and rights of citizens, and woman) 
(Bressler 2007:121). Derrida then, coins the concept of différance raising the questions of 
“What if?” And “What then?” and by reversing the binary operation of presence/absence, 
transcendental signified can no longer be imagined and “no longer is there an absolute 
standard or coherent unity from which knowledge proceeds and develops” (Ibid:125) 
Theories of Citizenship 
To have a better understanding state of citizen rights in Iran we employed the following 
texts on citizenship: Theory, Culture and society Mutation in Citizenship (2006) by Aihwa 
Ong; Catherin Neveu (2014) Practicing Citizenship from The Ordinary to The Activist; 
Bauböck (2010) Studying citizenship Constellation. The theoretical concepts of 
citizenship provided in these texts deals with the states of individuals in their societies 
and in the globalizing world. Citizenship theories argue the rights the citizens normally 
have or gain in the society. The texts argue on the individuals ’ freewill to decide for their 
lives as well as the responsibility they have toward the society. In the modern states the 
government does not monitor and force the citizens to follow the norms, but it is the 
citizen that is self-governed by appreciating the moral and legal limitations. Moreover, 
the government must follow the law and it cannot be autocratic.  
Theoretical Texts on Human Rights 
In order to have a better understanding of the human rights, in some parts of analysis 
chapter and discussion chapter we point to the historical development of the Human 
Rights, the goals, the achievements, and the challenges the states might have with them. 
For this purpose we use two main texts: Mark Mazower’s The Strange Triumph of Human 
Rights, 1933-1950; Jack Donnelly’s The Relative Universality of Human Rights; and 
Religion, Human Rights and International Law edited by Javaid Rehman and Susan C. 
Breau.  
The concepts of ‘Universal Human Rights’ and ‘Islamic Human Rights Law’ are two other 
terms that in analyzing the second analytical section have been employed. These two 
concepts –as two different sets of values–in many ways have contradicting views of 
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human rights, citizenship and the relationship between state and its citizens. The ‘human 
rights’ as a package –also a set of values that encompass every social and political aspects 
in a society –now is a corner stone to evaluate if a state has a good government.    
Universal human rights and Islamic human rights in a globalized world –characterized 
by, for example, mass media and the need of good governing values –are challenging each 
other. Particularly Islam and Islamic regimes perceive the universal human rights values 
as an instrument shaped by the Western world to intervene in the Islamic world, and to 
challenge the sovereignty of the Islamic states. On the other hand, International Human 
Rights Organizations claim and argue that traditional religious values and views on 
human rights –for instance Islamic Law –cause violation of human rights in these 
societies (Akbarzadeh &MacQueen 2008). 
The main theoretical understanding for the relationship between these two concepts can 
be followed in Javaid Rehman and Susan Breua (2007). Rehman and Breua’s 
conceptualization of human rights –Universal and Islamic –touches different 
controversial issues such as the freedom of beliefs, women rights and the right of 
minorities. They represent both sets of values-the universal’s as well as the Islamic –
argument for human rights. In order to gain a better understanding of these iss ues in 
Iran, we also consider the Islamic values and the IRI’s definition of human rights. 
Furthermore, achieving an understanding for how these two different perceptions of 
human rights challenging each other is another purpose for using these concepts.          
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Chapter 3: Analysis 
3.1 Theocracy and Legitimacy 
The following analytical section deals with the first sub-question as an approach to 
achievement of internal legitimacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s (IRI)–as a theocratic 
regime. Furthermore, this section touches issues such as roles and degrees of religious 
values in defining Iranian self-understanding and national identity in the pre- and post-
revolutionary Iran; a brief historical background of the regime; and the perception and 
understanding of human rights values from the IRI’s perspective.  
3.1.1 From Pahlavi to IRI: The Revolution of 1979 
A brief historical background of the country’s social and political situation and the way 
Shi’i clergymen became involved in the political system, is beneficial to understand the 
political development in Iran after the 1979 Revolution. 
The 1979 Revolution emerged, due to “the coincidence of societal structural change with 
class upheaval and the coincidence of political with social transformation” (Skocpol 
1979:4-5). Mohammad Reza Shah attempted to modernize the society –by liberal 
economic reforms. However, an expansion of capitalism as a widespread economic 
policy was regarded as the Western’s plan to colonize Iran (Skocpol 1979). Such beliefs 
raised many opposing voices –especially from religious communities and figures –the 
developing anti-colonial and anti-Western ideologies became the obstacle for liberal 
economic reforms. The other obstacles were un-well developed cities and illiteracy. The 
considerable populations of Iran were uneducated, living in villages and the cities. 
Therefore Iran lacked foundational elements for successful economic liberalization. 
Furthermore, Pahlavi’s failure in political and economical reformations –such as White 
Reform –coincided with dissatisfaction of unemployed people in urban and rural areas. 
Ideological reasons –for instance struggling imperialism and attempts to delink the 
capitalist world economy –on one hand and religion and Islamic ideology on the other 
hand, were among some sources that contributed to the idea of the revolution. It  
particularly was an upheaval against dominated class of the society and the Crony 
capitalistic system (Panah 2002:285ff and Skocpol 1982).  
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The Revolution was carried out by a coalition of urban workers, students, merchants, 
unemployed people and Islamic religious leaders. Islamic religious leaders and 
occasions were important in tying merchants, artisans and workers together. The values 
of Shi’i –as an Islamic sect –played a crucial role for the revolution’s successes, both 
organizationally and culturally. After topple of the Shah and the partial disintegration of 
the state it was fundamentalist Shi’i Mullahs by the leadership of Khomeini who took the 
main positions in their hands as the revolutionary state-builders (Skocpol 1982:265ff 
and Rauh 2013).  But Shi’i Islamic ideology was just one of the struggling ideologies –
such as Marxists (Organization of Iranian People’s Fadaian), Communits (the Toda Parti) 
and Mujahidins (People’s Mujahedin of Iran) –during the revolution. After the 
succession of the Revolution, and just right after Khomeini’s arrival to Tehran, he began 
excluding other groups who had important roles in victory of the Revolution. He 
justified the Revolution as: people’s fight for God and not worldly affairs , “no one would 
give his life for better agriculture. Dignity is better than full bellies” (Parsa 2011:53).  
Parsa refutes this claim that Islamic ideology was the only one responsible for the 
victory of the Revolution. Majority of individuals who participated in the uprising did 
not want to give their lives, but instead expected to improve their lives and “their deaths 
were the result of political repression, not a desire for martyrdom” (Parsa 2011:53-55). 
Iran’s post-revolutionary periods is characterized by a reign of terror. Post-Revolution 
Iran witnessed the suppression of the people with different beliefs then Islamic one. 
Since the IRI turned to be a parochial regime with core values of Islam, the women 
became marginalized in social and political activities; they were also forced to follow 
Islamic norms which then became part of the constitution –such as wearing 
‘hijab’(Zewde 2009:19).  
3.1.2 IRI as a Theocratic Regime 
In the early Islamic revolutionary period, establishment of theocratic regime was 
challenged by two main issues. Firstly, ignoring a long legacy of constitutional tradition 
by the founders of the Islamic Republic was not possible. Secondly, the Islamic regime 
was based on an ideology that competed with other groups and ideologies –like 
Marxists, liberals, secularists. As a result, the founders of the regime were obliged to 
prove that they were not ‘reactionaries’, and they constantly claimed that Is lam is not 
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outdated and it has all answers to the problem of the contemporary world (Chehabi 
1991:78).  It shows that the IRI political legitimacy from the early outset was questioned 
by many critics, intellectuals and political opponents. 
A considerable structure of constitution of the Islamic Republic is inspired by the 
political systems of Western countries, but with the core essence of revolutionary 
rhetoric and Islamic law. This has caused a complex and contradictory political system, 
positioned somewhere between theocracy and democracy; and the Supreme Leader –as 
the protector of religious values –has the decisive absolute power. The governing power 
is distributed a long series of popularly elected and clerical (non-elected) councils, 
assemblies and offices, each of which has different areas of influence and responsibility. 
Due to the framework and composition of the political system in the IRI any major and 
rapid political reform has been practically impossible (Barnekow Rasmussen 2009:1-6). 
The IRI’s governing system is mostly understood as theocracy. Houchang E. Chehabi –a 
prominent scholar in International Relation and history –defines theocracy as “Almost 
all societies have had separate spiritual and temporal authorities, when this dual structure 
disappears and the religious institution takes over temporal power as well, the political 
system is termed theocracy” (Chehabi 1991:69). In a theocratic political system God is 
recognized as the immediate rule and His laws are taken as the legal codes of the  
community and He becomes the source of all political legitimacy in the society.  
Since decades ago one can observe consideration of the religious values in the policies of 
the regimes in the Middle East. In many Islamic societies –like Afghanistan, Iraq and 
Egypt –religious political parties took the power, but not every Islamic nation succeeded 
to establish a theocratic regime.  Ran Hirschl states that the  “principles of theocratic 
governance may pose a threat to the cultural and policy preferences of secular-nationalist 
elites in these countries” (Hirschl 2008:1184). Hirschl’s statement reflects the challenges 
of the regimes with religious core values.  
Khomeini asserts that, in an Islamic system of governance experts –understood as 
technocrats –would run the day-to-day aspect of governance by the supervision of 
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faqih3, and there would be no need for a fully democratic parliament, but some sort of 
[Islamic] assembly would assist the government. Furthermore he puts that, “ if laws are 
needed, Islam has established them all. There is no need… after establishing a government, 
to sit down and draw up laws” (Chehabi 1991:75). Therefore the IRI can be considered to 
be a fundamentalist theocracy with governing principles and practices that bear very 
little resemblance to prevailing principles of western constitutionalism. Since the 
succession of the regime the process of ‘Islamization’ of law, juridical institutions and 
the political system have taken place (Ibid). However, governing structures still features 
many elements of a constitutional democracy.  
The preamble of the 1979 Islamic Republic Constitution enshrined the Shari'a as the 
supreme law-superior even to the Constitution itself (Hirschl 2008: 1198). After the 
Revolution the Islamic regime drafted its own constitution. The new constitution was 
entirely based on the Islamic codes and values, with the exclusive control of clerics 
chosen by the religious leader and Velayat-e faqih4. The theocratic system gave the 
supreme leader an unlimited authority and a high position as Marja’ 5. Khomeini, as the 
first Supreme Leader, was both the highest ranking cleric and the political leader of the 
state –double legitimacy.  
Velayat-e faqih (Rule of The Jurisprudent) 
The formation of the Islamic republic constitution in the post-revolution period was 
entirely in contrast with what Khomeini promised Iran people. About one year after his 
return, during an interview about the religious scholars’ role in the  new political 
structure, he rejected all assertions that Ayatollahs want to take the political power in 
Iran and he stressed that;  
“The religious scholars do not wish to become Prime Minister or President, and indeed 
it is not in their interest to do so. They do, however, have a role to play . . . the role they 
have is one of supervision, not of assuming executive positions without the proper 
expertise . . . the expertise of the religious scholars lies in the area of Islamic law 
(Mavani 2011:809).  
                                                                 
3 Faqih is according to Shi’ism the only legi timate successor of to the Prophet and the Imams.   
4 Velayat-e faqih: rule of the jurisprudent, a concept that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini introduced  
5 Marja’: source of imitation  
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By other words, as the oppositions claimed, Iran’s Constitution was tailor -made for 
Velayat-e faqih. However, coined doctrine and definition of Velayat- e faqih, was not 
accepted by many of the great and respectable Ayatollahs. Who opposed the Khomeini’s 
political Islam. For example Ayatollah Shariatmadari states that; “members of the clergy, 
whose role is a spiritual one, should not interfere in affairs of state”  (Chehabi 1991:77). 
Ayatollah Shariatmadari’s statement, as a respectable Shi’i clergy, is a clear rejection of 
Khomeini’s conceptualizing of political Islam that questions the regime’s legitimacy. In 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s formulation, the jurists consult – the Supreme Leader [al-wilaya 
al-mutlaqa] – obtain its legitimacy from God (Mavani 2011:807). From his view and 
arguments for justifying the legitimacy of the IRI; an Islamic state should be led by such 
a qualified jurist consult who would ensure that Islamic law and Islamic norms of ruling 
are adhered to and implemented within the broad outlines and general principles of the 
Shari’a(Mavani 2011:808). 
3.1.3 Political Structure of IRI 
Following is a brief depiction of the structural and institutional factors of IRI that 
influence debates, policymaking, and implementation of values. According to David E. 
Thaler et al. (2010) the formal political and institutional structure of the Iranian regime 
can be understood as intense and often brutal political environment that is dominated 
and outshined by factional competition and informal networks, which in many cases 
have a contradictory and opposing relationship with each other. “The political system 
and decision-making processes of the Islamic Republic are commonly described as 
“opaque” by Western observers of Iran” (Thaler et al. 2010:115).The structure of the 
Iranian political system is based on duality of theocracy and republicanism, with a 
hierarchical relation consisted of the Spiritual leader and the Guardian Council and its 
sub-institutions on one side, and the president and Parliament (majlis) on the other side. 
Many layers of political entities and the duality of power structure have co mplicated the 
matter of opaqueness further.”The Iranian constitution empowers unelected, appointed 
institutions to challenge, undermine, and override the decisions made by the elected 
president (and his cabinet) and parliament” (Thaler et al. 2010:22). For example in 
vetting candidates, for example for the Parliament or the Presidency, the disqualified 
ones are considered as unworthy or not-qualified due to their lack of having 
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revolutionary and Islamic privileges. Apparently, freedom of speech and many oth er 
democratic and human rights principles are not regarded as interests of the regime. 
Further, the establishment and empowerment of multifarious institutions and their 
competition and friction with each other –for resources and more share of power –have 
caused a complicated political system. This existing design of institutional structure 
“prevents any one center of power from gaining undue influence over the entire system and 
ensures the overall survival and security of the regime and the central position  of the 
Supreme Leader” (Thaler et al. 2010:22).The judicial system in the IRI does not act 
independently; it is supervised by the Supreme Leader and the head of the judiciary is 
directly appointed by him. Shari’a is the source of the country’s penal code that provides 
the degree of punishment by flogging, amputation, and execution- by stoning or hanging 
for a range of social and political offenses- these punishments are carried out in practice 
(Freedomhouse 2013:6). The Supreme Leader –currently Ayatollah Ali Khamenei –is the 
most powerful figure in the IRI. The Assembly of Experts, a body of 86 clerics, chooses 
the supreme leader. The Supreme Leader has extensive authority, for instance he is  
“the commander in chief of the armed forces and appoints the leaders of the judiciary, 
the heads of state broadcast media, the Expediency Council, and half of the Guardian 
Council members” and he exercises “de facto control over appointments to the 
Ministries of Defense, Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Intelligence” (Freedomhouse 
2013:3).  
 
Figure 2 shows the ‘Distribution of Power in the [Iranian] Constitution; it is a depiction 
of the main structure of the political, judicial and religious power distribution in the 
Islamic regime of Iran. The structure consists of many institutions, but officially, the 
power is entirely shared between and controlled by the following main institutions: The 
Assembly of Experts (which elects the Supreme Leader), the Supreme Leader and the 
Guardian Council on one side and the President and the Islamic Parliament on the other 
side. The structure, as one can realizes, is based on a hierarchical order by the Supreme 
Leader at the overhead. There are many sub-institutions under the control of the 
Supreme Leader. These sub-institutions are either elected directly by the Supreme 
Leader or him-self supervise them. These sub-intuitions either possess many economic 
and political power or they have access to many economic resources in order to fulfill 
their aims and policies. The core task of these institutions is about providing and 
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protecting the interest of the Sacred Regime of Islamic Republic (Nezam’ Muqadas-e  
Jomhuri-e  Islami). Following is an example of the interaction of the institutions and sub-
institutions: 
“the executive branch shares some of its policymaking responsibilities  with the 
Supreme Leader; the legislative branch is comprised of two separate institutions, the 
Guardian Council and the Majles (the Iranian parliament), and the Guardian Council 
has direct authority over the Majles’ elections and legislation; and the armed forces are 
bifurcated between a regular army (the Artesh) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps (IRGC)” (Thaler et al. 2010:22). 
Figure 2 (Thaler et al. 2010:24) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1.4 The State’s Policies and Legitimacy 
Legitimacy and Manipulation of Identity 
Religious identity and defining Iranian national identity are two contradictory issues in 
regime’s national policies. The IRI, during its governing period, has attempted to employ 
many different strategies, contradictory definitions and historical narratives to 
reconstruct what it means to be Iranian. Employing different definitions such as Islamic 
Ummah of Iran indicate the conflict of the regime’s ideologies with the nation and 
historical self-understanding of Iranians (Holliday 2007). “The Constitution of the Islamic 
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Republic of Iran advances the cultural, social, political, and economic institutions of 
Iranian society based on Islamic principles and norms, which represent an honest 
aspiration of the Islamic Ummah” (Holliday 2007:77). During the last century of Iran’s 
history, Iranian national identity has been phrased in many different and contradictory 
ways. Through the Late Qajar Period and Constitutional Period (1906-1921), the need to 
resist imperialism was one of the motivating factors for nationalism in Iran. During this 
period the construction of national identity and the desire for national ‘progress’, 
concepts such as “anti-imperialism, pre-Islamic culture, or Īrānīyat,” [had] been used. 
Īrānīyat is perceived as the means of attaining progress and restricting European 
dominance (Holliday 2007:57-58). 
Historically, Iranian nationalism, which is based on Īrānīyat as an essential factor in the 
construction of national identity, is often associated with the idea of land and territory –
patriotism. Developments of the secular perception of national identity were based on 
territorial boundaries. The emphasis on Iranian identity –in contrast with Arab and non-
Persian identity –is more tangible in the Pahlavi era. The importance of the territory of 
Iran was reflected during employing such concepts as;” khalq-i Īrān (people of Iran), 
khāk-i Īrān (soil of Iran), and Īrān khān-i māst (Iran is our home)” (Holliday 2007:58). 
During the governance of Reza Shah -1921 to 1941 –there was a great emphasis on 
‘Iranian nationality’. This nationalism was partly used as a reaction to Islamic culture 
and religious self-understanding as well as an attempt to make Iran united and 
homogenized. Further appeals to a sense of ‘Aryan ethnicity’ and ‘pre -Islamic 
Zoroastrian’ culture could be traced in national policies of both Reza Shah and 
Mohammed Reza shah. During this period the term ‘Persianization’ of the state became a 
fundamental part of government policy. The regime of Shah by supporting Persian 
Language Academy attempted to reduce Arabic words from the Persian language 
(Holliday 2007:60-65). 
During the three decades of Iran, Iranian nationalism and national identity have by IRI 
been reconstructed and differentiated from pervious perceptions. Khomeini and his 
discourse of ‘religious nationalism’ were the fundamental elements in understanding 
and forming a new Iranian national identity (Holliday 2007:74-75). Khomeini used the 
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term ‘religious nationalism’ to deconstruct former Iranian nationalism. Moreover anti-
imperialism and populism were integral to Khomeini’s discourse,  “it was Islam, and 
particularly Shi'ism, that were considered as the overriding ideology and the means of 
achieving Khomeini’s aims – independence and what he perceived to be a more “just” 
society. For this reason, ‘Khomeinism’ and religious nationalism can be considered in terms 
of an Islamist discourse of national identity” (Holliday 2007:76-77).  By emphasizing 
religious collective values, the history of Islam and the Muslim Ummah –as well as duties 
of every Muslim toward God, Islamic communities and other Muslims –tried to replace 
Islamic Iranian Cultural values with the Persian cultural values. The example of this 
could be the Iranian celebration of Nourouz –which is the ancient Iranian culture –has 
been always regarded as a disgrace of Islamic Iranian Ummah by the Mullahs. The 
Regime has tried to reduce the popularity of such events by glorifying the Islamic events 
such as Qurban Eid and Eid-e- Fitr.  Consequently, one may see that “Islam does not 
recognize national boundaries, [and] it would be incompatible with nationalism” (Holliday 
2007:79). 
According to Holliday to understand the present definition of “to be Iranian” demands 
multi-dimensional approach to it.  Holliday argues “that competing discourses of national 
identity advocated by political figures from Musaddiq to the current administration [2011] 
demonstrate a politics of resistance to both internal and external forces”  (Holliday 
2011:1). Abdolkarim Soroush (1945) argues that Iranian identity experiences three 
contradicting cultures –Iranian culture, Islamic culture and Western culture – the mixture 
of cultural values of these categories have made it difficult to define being an Iranian. 
These three cultures and relationship between them in many cases fuel the contestation 
of Iranian national identity. However, the Regime has tried to redefine national identity, 
mostly based on Islamic culture. In this regard in defining ´true Iranian national 
Identity´, two notions are more prioritized. For some the Iranian national identity might 
be understood as Īrānīyat, a notion that indicates ‘remembering’ Iran’s ‘original’ pre-
Islamic culture and the glory of Iranian civilization. For others, Islāmīyat might be the 
main source for understanding and defining Iranian national identity. Accordingly, there 
is a great emphasis on Islamic Shi’i culture and the glory of Islamic civilization. Then in 
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general, both of these two notions –to varying degrees –are used in the construction of 
Iranian national identity by IRI as the authentic and legitimate one (Holliday 2011: 1 -2). 
Hence, Holliday argues that“[More recently] the presidencies of Khatami and 
Ahmadinezhad have also played their part in the continuing reconstruction of Iran’s 
national identity” (Holliday 2011:3-4).  
Nowadays, as we can witness the Western culture seems to be glamorous one compared 
to the Islamic-Iranian culture for many Iranians, especially the new generations –for its 
tempting values of individualism and the rights to free will. In spite of the regime’s 
rejection of such values, the impacts of the Western lifestyle can be traced in everyday 
lives of people. The vast acceptance and preferences of the Western values by Iranians 
can be traced not only to the individualist and liberal ideologies but also to the similarity 
of such values to the ones ring the historical memories of Iranians -here we can point to 
the Cyrus Article (Davoodifard 2011). The Iranian or better to say Persian Identity is full 
of proud with such historical self-understanding. The penetration of the liberal and the 
human rights values in to the structural stratification of Islamic-Iranian culture, 
jeopardizes the popularity of the built Islamic culture –as the foundations of the regime.             
De-familiarization of the nation with Persian culture, in the favor of the production of 
Islamic Shi’i culture for consistency of regime’s legitimacy, might also be regarded by 
many critics as the identity crises (Takeyh 2003).  Ray Takeyh puts that the Iranians, 
because of very differentiated and contradictory narratives in conceptualization of 
Iranian national identity, are confused in searching true national Identity. He claims that 
“Iran today is a nation in search for an identity, a state that oscillates between promises of 
democratic modernity and retrogressive tradition” (Takeyh 2003:53). Due to the 
emergence of Islamic reformations it is impossible to reconstruct the pre -1977 situation 
as the present values are part of new generations’ realities, even though they ignore 
such values. In the new Iran the theocratic system is challenged by people´s demand for 
change and reform based on global human rights standards. Such reforming challenges 
encompass women endeavor in seeking emancipation and equality, and also the claim of 
marginalized to be active in socially and politically; “despite the ominous shadow of 
violence, the old order will change, the transformation of the society cannot obstructed 
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through coercion or appeased by cosmetic reform”.  As Akbar Ganji, an Iranian journalist 
stated “the genies are out of the bottles. And the bottles that once contained them are 
cracked” (Takeyh 2003:55). 
Legitimacy and Its Decay 
With regard to having a deeper understanding of how the regime achieves its legitimacy, 
the following sub-section focuses more on the term political legitimacy.   
The concept of ‘legitimacy’ is a central issue in all modern social and political relations. 
Legitimacy has been regarded as the core of political regime and organizations in their 
internal and external relations. By other words legitimacy is “the master question of 
politics” (Gilley 2006: 499). Legitimacy of act(s) is an important element for founding 
and maintaining national and international stability that will be understood as “the 
normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed” , moreover “to 
convince another that your cause is legitimate is to convince him that you are morally 
correct and he should support your cause or at least not oppose it”  (Fox & Sandler 
2004:35). 
States, constitutions, politicians, religions, judges, nations, laws and processes are 
among some objects of studies of political legitimacy. Political legitimacy as an 
important determinant affects state’s structure, state’s ability of operation and the 
durability and stability of the state. Otherwise, weak degrees of or lack of political 
legitimacy mean implications for the way a state or political system behaves toward its 
citizens and others. According to Bruce Gilley, one issue related to absence of political 
legitimacy in the relation between state and its citizen is that “States that lack legitimacy 
devote more resources to maintaining their rule and less to effective governance, which 
reduces support and makes them vulnerable to overthrow or collapse” (Gilley 2006: 499).  
During the IRI’s history it has been challenged by a lot of issues related to the degree of 
its legitimacy. Theocracy as a model of governance in a global era is not a favorable 
governing system, due to the rejection of the realities other than the religious ones by 
the regime. Furthermore, when religious involves in political issues and becomes a 
instrument of gaining power, the holiness of it decrease. Religion claims to be for 
salvation of human being based on honesty, rightfulness, justice, etc while institutions’ 
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involvement in political activities are for gaining power –especially through 
international relations. Despite the opposition of some great clergymen to become a part 
of the political and governing system in Iran in the post-revolution period, just couple of 
years after the revolution and establishing the Islamic Republic they become the 
dominate actors in the Iranian political system (Banuazizi 1995: 570-575).   
The word ‘rightful’ –which means ‘in accordance with accepted standards of moral or 
legal behaviour, justice –is a notion that has been employed in explaining political 
legitimacy (Gilley 2006:501). State’s policy in providing ‘common interest’ –that is above 
individual and partial interests –is a crucial factor for defining the legitimacy of political 
system. State’s degree of enjoying legitimacy depends on the support of its citizens. This 
support might be gained in light of citizens considered views of what is best from a 
public perspective and not by force, fear and favour (Gilley 2006:501).  
Following David Beetham (1991), views of legality, views of justification and acts of 
consent, are three constitutive sub-types of legitimacy, which together define the notion 
of ‘rightfulness’(Gilley 2006:502). Briefly, the views of legality is related to the state’s 
ability and exercising political power in a manner that accords with citizens view about 
laws, rules and customs. Views of justification are based on conformity to share 
principles, ideas and values; and concerns citizens’ responses to the way state holds and 
exercises its power. Citizens’ understanding and regime’s justification of legal power 
might be different. As a consequence of these differentiated view a ‘legality gap’ will 
appear. The third sub-types of legitimacy, the acts of consent, is the political system’s 
offer for vanishing the legality gap, and it refers to “positive actions [of state] that express 
a citizen’s recognition of the state’s right to hold political authority and an acceptance, at 
least in general, to be bound to obey the decisions that result” (Gilley 2006:503).  
Olivier Roy puts that, conceptualizing religious and national identity, IRI experiences 
some crisis of legitimacy. The IRI’s way of justifying its legitimacy contents some 
contradictory arguments. “God’s sovereignty and the people’s will”, are supposed to be 
the core of the regime’s legitimacy, as it is apparent the God’s words and religious 
realities have superiority to the people’s will (Roy 1999:202). 
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Jonathan Fox & Shmuel Sandler state that “Religion can legitimate not only governments 
but also policies followed by governments, including policies that might otherwise be 
considered objectionable in an era where human rights are one of the major 
considerations” (Fox and Sandler 2004:38). The IRI after more than three decades of 
existence still uses religion, Revolution’s ideologies and related Islamic values to justify 
its politics. Religion is the main source of legitimacy of the IRI. For example Khomeini, 
regarding justification for the emergence of institutions such as the Vilayat-e faqih, the 
Council Guard …., argued that “the jurists were the messianic Imam’s general deputies 
(nowwab-i ‘amm)”. There are some controversies in the regime’s arguments of its 
sources of legitimacy. On one hand they do not regard public allegiance necessary for 
their legitimacy –for gaining their legitimacy from Islam and words of God –but on the 
other hand, paradoxically to regime’s authoritativeness, they claims(Mavani 2011:815) 
that values of governance in the Iranian Islamic state are consistence with democratic 
principles and norms. One example of the controversies, in what the regime argues and 
how it acts, is the emergence of movements as the results of the 2009 presidential 
election. Ayatullah Kadivar –a prominent supporter of Khatemi during the Khatemi’s 
period –states that “reconciliation between democracy and government based on velayat-
e faqih is impossible’. Instead, he proposes a ‘divine-democratic sovereignty’ (mashru‘iyyat-
I ilahi-ye mardom)6 system of governance” (Mavani 2011:815).  
In our global era, states’ policies that relay on coercion –and not individual freedom –
their policies are regarded as illegitimate (Gilley 2006:499). The Iranian people’s 
reaction to the unsatisfactory result on the 2009 presidency election reflects the weak 
ties of the people and governance relation. And people’s reaction can be perceived as 
questioning the regimes legitimacy. As Elizabeth L. Rauh states “the Green Movement 
protestors and supporters challenged the Islamic Republic’s claim to the legacy of the 
1979 Revolution and, thus, the very legitimacy of government authority” (Rauh 
2013:1316). Moreover, the 2009 protests can be perceived as Iranian’s challenging of  
“the current Islamic Republic’s claim to the legacy and ideals of the 1979 Revolution. 
The protesters, by their protests and anti-IRI and anti-Supreme Leader slogans and 
                                                                 
6
 A political system which gains its legit imacy for the broad support of the people 
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activities undermined the government’s legitimacy as an upholder of the Islamic faith, 
and, ultimately, the state’s authority over the Iranian people”(Rauh 2013:1324).  
The Green Movement’s protesters reemployed slogans like “Marg bar dictator,” which 
means “Death to the dictator” or “Down with the dictator,” adapts the 1979 
revolutionary slogans “Marg bar Shah” (Down with the Shah), but this time it were the 
Supreme Leader and the Velayat-e faqih they protest against. This act of opposing the 
current regime by shouting a slogan used against the Shah in 1979 reveals the Green 
Movement’s subversive redirection of revolutionary zeal. “Shouts of “Marg bar dictator” 
threatened the legitimacy of Khamenei and the Islamic Republic by equating them with the 
corrupt and authoritarian Pahlavi regime” (Rauh 2013:1324). Events and conflicts like 
those form the 2009 Green Movement, and particularly when elites like Mir-Huseyn 
Musavi, Mehdi Karubi and others who question the legitimacy of IRI, testify the 
arguments on the IRI lack of legitimacy, as Gilley (2006) conceptualizes, the IRI is ‘crying 
the legitimacy ’ of power (Gilley 2006).  
Further, Gilley asserts that “a state is more legitimate the more that it is treated by its 
citizens as rightfully holding and exercising political power (Gilley 2006: 500). Gilley’s 
definition of state legitimacy touches elements such as citizens, state, rightfulness, 
holding and exercising political power. As Gilley states, the concept of state legitimacy at 
deeper level concerns with the ability of citizens to make autonomous judgment and the 
separability of political power from other forms of social and [religious] power (Gilley 
2006: 501). Legitimacy of governing and acting is the complementary device to physical 
power. Religion as a shared belief in a society can act as a matter of identity; therefore it 
has been regarded as a powerful source of legitimacy. It enabling the regime to survive 
and reduce the need for persuasion via the use of force. Religious legitimacy can support 
the status quo or challenge it (Fox & Sandler2004:4).  
From the outset of the foundation of the IRI, with regard to legitimating the regime and 
the Iranians’ acceptance of Islamic political system, the use of the concept of Islamic 
Ummah played crucial role (Holliday 2007:77). Strong religious beliefs have rooted in 
the society and culture of Iran, as the majority of Iranians are Muslims.  In contrast with 
Khomeini’s pre-IRI establishment statement: “The religious scholars do not wish to 
become Prime Minister or President, and indeed it is not in their interest to do so” (Mavani 
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2011:809), the Ayatollahs have extensive involvement in the political system and their 
intervention in all aspects of governance and the personal lives of people. The forces of 
religious-political values to everyday lives of people decreased the faith of the individual 
in the political Islam and the clergies who are politicians. Conflicts between the regime’s 
own elite groups – either for power and interest or different ideological perception of 
sharia’ law – in the last two decades of rule of the IRI and people’s mass protests against 
the regimes policies have together contributed to decreasing the legitimacy of the 
regime.  
After the presidential election of 2005, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) 
Basiji, and the Guard's political clout – both in number and achieving authority - grew 
rapidly. The reactions of the security forces to the protest movements of 2009 and 2010 
have been harsh. From the beginning the state Medias labeled the protestors as 
‘hypocrites, monarchists, thugs, and seditionists’. Many protestors and o pposition 
leaders became arrested and tortured. IRGC becomes an important instrument of power 
holders to maintain power and crackdown all kinds of protests and social movements, in 
this regard the IRI’s reactions were for protecting the interest of the reg ime (maslehat-e 
nezam) ( Jahanbegloo 2012). IRGC‘s denunciation and suppression of the post-election 
protests in 2009 were perceived by many as the beginning of the consolidation of a 
military state, now theocratic only in name. Jahanbegloo states that ”one of the most 
important implications of this development is that the IRGC is now able to confront and 
subdue, by any means necessary, all those who actually or potentially pose a threat to the 
stability of the Islamic Republic”( Jahanbegloo 2012). Due to the brutality of IRGC, 
compare to those in Tunisia and Egypt, the civic movement in Iran had a much harder 
struggle ahead. The IRI’s crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrations in Tehran and 
other Iranian cities have eroded the image of the regime as the vanguard of the 
resistance against oppressors in the Muslim world. Regardingly “The regime has based 
much of its international appeal upon being a righteous Islamic answer to corrupted 
regimes around the Middle East; now the government's anti-democratic domestic policies 
are steadily sweeping away its legitimacy as "popular" and "Islamic” (Jahanbegloo 2012). 
Since the main decisions of the regime – they may have impact on the main structures of 
the regime and its ideologies – are only in domain of Supreme Leader’s Power; even the 
 30 
 
president is powerless to struggle for reformation – whether political or social – or 
stands against Velayat-e faqih’s preferences. Example of this argument is the election 
slogan of president Rohani in 2013: he promised to attempt for reforming policies based 
on equality of man and women; however, Supreme Leader rejected this perspective of 
equality and regarded it as a incorrect Western belief. Consequently it was president 
Rohani who didn’t show reaction to the stance of Supreme Leader. The passivity of 
president Rohani can be explained by the powerful position of the Supreme Leader 
which means that “The president in Iran is more like a prime minister, since the supreme 
leader is the true head both of the state and of the government” (WilsonCenter 2013:19), 
and as Michael Adler  claims, the presidents can only implement reformist policies if  he 
has “the green light from Iran’s Supreme Leader and ultimate decision maker, Ayatollah 
Ali Khamenei, to stress engagement over hardline tactics…” (as quoted in WilsonCenter 
2013:3).  
3.2 Superpowers and The Human Rights  
This section is a response to our second research question on the role of superpowers in 
expansion of the human rights values.  
Human rights values could not turn to be global and popular if there was not the support 
and cooperation of the states. Hence, in the expansion of the human rights values, the 
more powerful states play important roles, because of their political, financial and 
military supports.  
Reviewing the historical development of Human Rights Organizations reveals the 
important roles of the superpowers –such as the USA and the Britain –in the formation 
and growth of Human Rights Organizations in the world. It was the decision of the 
Western powers- the earlier Colonizers- that gave birth to this universal phenomenon- 
after the Atlantic Charter in 1941 till the UN’s Universal declaration of 1948. This rise of 
human rights became to be considered as the triumph of civilization over real politics and 
barbarism (Mazower 2004: 380-1). 
The initial attempts to cast equal rights for minorities –ethnic and religious minorities or 
citizens with other nationalities –in the Western states can be regarded as the first steps 
towards establishment of the universal human rights. The primary stances of the 
Western states for coming to an agreement on giving equal rights to the minorities were 
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contradictory. While Germany proposed for generalization of support of minorities’ 
rights in 1929 –aiming to support German nationals living in other countries –it was 
treated half-heartedly by other great powers. However, lack of cooperation led to the 
ineffectiveness of the League of Nations. In August 1941, it was Roosevelt- the USA 
president- who encouraged the states “to preserve human rights and justice in their own 
lands as well as in other lands” (Mazower 2004:383-5). 
While the arguments of newly established human rights spread all over the world, 
raised post structural and post-colonial debates challenging this phenomenon. “The 
seduction of human rights discourse has been so great that it has delayed the development 
of critique of rights” (Donnelly 2007:298). The main critic might lay on the key roles of 
the advocators of equal rights. The superpowers like the US and the other Western 
democratic countries play important roles in promoting human rights abroad, mostly in 
the so-called third world countries –that was mostly considered by the critics as a 
hegemonic phenomenon to change the structures and realities of other nations.  
The human rights do not seem to be conditional any more, but they are now the rights of 
every human being to have. The burden of providing these equal rights for the 
individuals all over the world remains of the shoulders of the NGOs and their 
advocators, to convince the states’ governments for adapting and  implementing the new 
standard values. However, there could be seen the pressures of the international 
community on the governments that do not cooperate or have no tendency to adapt and 
implement the human rights values. An example of human rights enforcement by active 
participation of world powers is the  
“Operation Restore Democracy” in Haiti in 1994, carried out by the United States and 
authorised by the Security Council” . Then, a US-led force, called “Operation Restore 
Democracy” was established with more than 15,000 US troops and a symbolic group 
of soldiers from other countries, such as Bangladesh, Barbados, Guyana, Ghana and 
Great Britain, and as a result, President Aristide was returned to power (Manokha 
2009:440).  
The superpowers play an important role in the UN’s policies and potentials to stop 
violations of human rights. Since the international respect is an important criterion for 
existence of states’ regimes in contemporary world, the democratic states can press ure 
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the less democratic ones to practice democratic norms and consider human rights in 
their constitutions. Otherwise, they might face sanctions and therefore international 
support of the opposing voices within the states. So far, it seems “the fundamental rule of 
Westphalian/Vatellian sovereignty [that] is to refrain from intervening in the internal 
affairs of other states [and] each state has the right to determine its own domestic 
authority Structures” (Krasner 2004: 88) is not considered fully any more. Whether this 
Utopian dream of a world with the equal human rights achieved fully, the states 
definitely will not have their sovereignty as before.  
Cox puts that in the modern world “the economic life of subordinate nations is penetrated 
by and intertwined with that of powerful nations” (Cox 2005:42). If we consider the 
economic superstructure of each society as the main one in the global era, then it can be 
argued that the other superstructures –social, political and cultural –and their values 
could be influenced by the great powers –which play determining roles in the economy 
of weak states. In this regard the advocators of the human rights –the states with 
powerful economy –can insert the secular values to the constitutions of the weaker 
states. This worries more the undeveloped or developing countries, as the economic 
liberalization and the activities of global organizations, predominantly Human Rights, 
will make possible the hegemonic domination of the West over the developing countries. 
Donnelly states that “Today, human rights are backed by the world’s preponderant 
political, economic, and cultural powers and have become ideologically hegemonic in 
international society” (Donnelly (2007:282). The familiar term neocolonialism then 
comes in mind revealing, “the greater emphasis on modern power shaping a new form of 
imperial ambition whereby a sovereign state (i.e. Iraq) is held under political, economic, 
and military control by a hegemonic power (i.e. the USA)” (Welch 2010:124).  
This fact might result in fading the ideologies of different nations through 
homogenization of the nations. The change in the world order and international power 
system not only worries the weak states, but also the powerful states especially when it 
comes to who or which state takes leading role in the world order. This anxiety was 
more evident when US began to take leading role in the world with surprisingly 
widespread desire since 1948 and during cold war due to cooperation of the great 
powers (Mazower 2004: 392-4). 
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There is less doubt in advantages of the great democratic powers’ advocacy of human 
rights, but the problem is that if this advocacy be used as a tool for controlling and 
weakening other states and fashioning the political structure of the regimes. Pollmann 
states that: 
“Besides the function of geographical diversion, human rights rather had and still have 
the role, on the other hand, to weaken ‘socialist’ or ‘communist’ tendencies in Eastern 
Europe and worldwide and to facilitate capitalist development by legal rule as the 
most modern framework. … the U.S. viewed human rights as designed to improve the 
condition of human rights in countries other [than] the United States (and a very few 
like-minded liberal states)( Pollmann 2005:147). 
Above said is also affirmed by Henry Kissinger in 2001- former U.S. secretary of state- by 
referring to the Final Act of the Helsinki conference, that human rights primarily was 
considered as a diplomatic weapon to use against the Soviet Union (Pollmann 
2005:147). As it seems the great powers might use human rights advocacy as an 
instrument to fashion the states’ regimes in a way profit them. If we compare Iran and 
Saudi Arabia, we see that IRI is less conservative regarding minorities’ rights and 
women’s rights (Oborne 2012). As Hamdan puts, “Despite the fact that the society and the 
tradition favour men’s education over women’s, the disparity between boys and girls in the 
unequal distribution of educational funds is a logical reflection of gender hierarchies in the 
overall society”(Hamdan 2005:60). However, the stances of great powers like the U.S and 
Britain are contradictory towards these states that show the precedence of great powers 
over profits over policing of human rights’ violation. If an undemocratic state is an ally 
with a great power then because of military and economic benefits the great power 
might not put too much pressure on the autocratic government for reformation. This 
difference is visible in the visit of President Obama with Saudi authorities in Riyadh in 
April 20147, Saudi Authorities asserted that they were worried about empowerment of 
IRI in the Middle East –due to the Shi’i-Sunni challenges of IRI and Saudi Arabia.   Sunni 
community does not regard Shia sect as a true follower of Islam –vise versa –and 
expansion of Shia beliefs is regarded as a threat to Sunni beliefs. Valbjørn and Bank state 
that the Middle East witnesses sectarian rifts within Islam that mainly seem to be as a 
Shi’i vs. Sunni association based on sectarian concerns that could be result of the 
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http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/world/2014/03/140328_l03_obama_saudi_visit.shtml , (accessed on 
24.4.2014)  
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regional states’ challenges for balancing the regional power –mainly between Sunni 
Saudi Arabia and Shi’ite Iran. (Valbjørn and Bank 2011:5-6) 
An expansion of the human rights values is one of the main feats o f globalization. Aijaz 
Ahmed considers globalization as “the latest phase in the history of imperialism” (Ahmed 
2002:94). He believes this edifice is held on international system of law and regulation, 
which demands new types of military technologies to deliver the imperial power 
message to enemies of ‘the world and its citizens’. Then, by the moral legitimization of 
imperial aggression, the great powers advocate the international law and the human 
rights gain the right of intervention on the side of human rights. For the great powers 
like the U.S. and Britain, “Democracy and human rights are absolute values, except when it 
comes to places like Saudi Arabia” (Ahmed 2002: 95-105). Ahmed’s argument may make 
sense in the case of Iran. The USA has convinced the Western societies and its allies that 
IRI could be a threat to peace of the world: by emphasizing on the equal rights and 
questioning the Islamic values; by pointing out the deficiencies of IRI’s policies in the 
country, Middle East regime and world; and by casting propaganda against Iran’s 
struggle to access nuclear technology.  As argued in the last analytical part, the 
theocratic state of Iran does not follow exactly the international democratic standards, 
does not adapt the human rights values and continuously violates them from Western 
democratic states perspective. The resistance of Iran for cooperating in the new global 
governing system, its geopolitical strategic situation, and being a regional power, 
worries the U.S and Britain in insuring their long term profits in the Middle Eastern 
countries, mostly the Arab countries. As argued above Obama visited Riyadh in order to 
assure the U.S.’s ally not to worry about threats from Iran, both regarding nuclear issues 
and ideological challenges. For The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Iran is a “mortal 
enemy and is to be resisted on all fronts” (Hykel 2013: 5). As it is apparent the aforesaid 
powers do not pressure seriously their allied states like Saudi Arabia, as much as they 
put pressure on Iran in case of equal human rights for the citizens. The presented 
arguments do not show the rejection of the human rights values, but is a critique on the 
super powers policies along with their support of the Human Rights.  
Putting aside the pessimistic arguments on the roles of the superpowers, we cannot 
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ignore the roles of superpowers and the international community in achieving 
considerable and positive improvement in the state of the human rights in the world. It 
is because of the cooperation of the states with the human rights organizations that we 
can hear the voices of the marginalized and minorities. The Realists highlight the 
important role of state in international relations as a rational actor. However, the 
cooperation of States for resolution of problems -like internal conflict, war and mass 
violation of human rights- that need states’ collective action, is very important 
(Oye1985:1ff.) Nevertheless, international politics of states are mainly matter of their 
interests in the anarchical world as well. Considering constructive roles of Superpowers, 
if it were not the cooperation of the great powers with the UN Organizations there 
would not be such a huge progress and success in the regulation of international laws 
and activities. The situation of minorities specifically the women in the less democratic 
states could never be elevated if it was not the forces, sanctions and encouragement of 
the democratic states. For the nations that have suffered under dictator regimes, the 
reaction and management of the great powers are more important than just declarations 
of the UN’s organizations. For a less democratic state like of Iran ignoring the UN’s 
declarations and violating the human rights would be easier because by practicing the 
conservative rules, it can keep its power structures safe. Currently, the new government 
of president Rohani has come with slogan of equality of rights for citizens, minorities 
and women. These small reformations, even not in practice, could never happen if there 
was not sanctions and pressure from the great powers like the U.S and the EU.  For 
instance, President Obama (2010) necessitated and ordered sanctions on eig ht senior 
officials in Iran for human rights abuses during the Presidency of Ahmadinejad.8  The 
continuous sanctions have had negative impacts on the value of the Iran’s currency –the 
Rial –and foreign direct investment in Iran, what brought Iran to the edge of economic 
bankruptcy (Habibi 2010). Mohammad Javad Larijani, the senior Iranian judiciary 
official, in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency states, “the issue of human rights is 
exploited by the West against the Islamic Republic. …  [He continues] ‘human rights’ has 
been turned (by the West) into a field for blackmailing and attacking the (Islamic)  
                                                                 
8 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/29/AR2010092904700.html 
Erdbrink, Thomas and William Branigin. Obama Orders Sanctions on Iranian Officials for human Rights 
Abuses. Available at: accessed on April 27,2014 
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establishment.”9  
3.3 Human Rights and IRI 
This analytical section is a response to the third sub-question on the policies of the IRI 
toward adaptation and implementation of human rights and the challenges the IRI might 
have as a theocratic regime with human rights. In this regards we probe if the Islamic 
values of the regime is compatible with human rights values or not. 
 3.3.1 Human rights: Relative and Universal 
Iran is one of the states that have been criticized for the unsatisfactory human rights 
situation in its society. However IRI as the legitimate regime of Iran has its own 
perspective of human rights. Based on the UNHR reports: Iran has continuou sly rejected 
the declarations of the UN –and the supporting superpowers –regarding the lack of 
specific social and political rights such as: freedom of speech, women’s rights and 
religious and minorities rights (UNHR 2014). We review both the theoretical arguments 
that respond to the universality of human rights; and the theoretical justifications that 
criticize the policies of conservative states like Iran towards human rights. In this regard 
the arguments are based on three main perspectives of human rights: ‘Universal human 
rights, Cultural Relativism’s view of human rights, and Islamic Perspective of human 
rights’. These three perspectives have different, perceptions and understanding of 
human rights values.  
According to John Donnelly, human rights –as an international political project –have 
a close tie to claims of universality and it “concerns the relationship between the 
individual and the state; it involves the status, claims, and duties of the former in the 
jurisdiction of the latter”. Donnelly claims that “these rights will ordinarily be perceived 
and understood to the rights that one has simply because one is human”  (Donnelly 
2007:283). Considering the term of universality, the rights are universal as long as 
they will be held universally. He states that human rights is as an instrument and set 
of values which attempts to provide an environment that allow “human beings, 
individually and in groups that give meaning and value to their lives, to pursue their 
                                                                 
9 http://www.tasnimnews.com/English/Home/Single/350706 Tasnim, West Misusing Human Rights 
Issue to Attack, Blackmail Islamic Iran. April 26, 2014 (accessed on April 27, 2014)  
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own visions of the good life“(Donnelly 2007:303). The history of human rights as 
institutionalized values goes back to the post-Second World War. In the onset of the 
process states were urged to recognize, practice, respect and promote the human 
rights values as the sanctity of the dignity that is inherent in all human beings . 
(Rehman & Breau 2007:12).   
As earlier mentioned, since the1979 revolution, Islamic values have been the main 
source in formation of constitution in the IRI. However, the IRI interestingly has ratified 
several international human rights declarations, and joined more international 
agreements concerning human rights (Davoodifard 2011:130). The degree of human 
rights acceptance and implementation varies in different periods of governances in Iran. 
For instance, during the Khatami’s presidency (Khatami 2002) Iranians experienced 
some degree of improvement in the social rights; while during eight years of 
Ahmadinejad’s presidency there was a terrible suppression of such rights. During 
Khatami’s presidency political activities, NGO-formation and debates on human rights in 
Iran contributed the establishment of independent institutions in civil society, finding 
the opportunity to involve in political and societal debates and discussions. This 
evolution and “new viewpoint of relationship replaced the earlier extensive opposite 
policies of Iranian government with international human rights organizations regarding 
to criticizing its human rights behavior“ (Davoodifard 2011:128-130). 
The concept of human rights has today become an important form of social ordering 
which its impact cannot be ignored by any state or society. The argument for the 
status of the human rights as a social ordering is that there is a stro ng link between 
respect for human rights and development within state and society  (Rehman & Breau 
2007:320).  
Samuel Huntington in his well-known book ‘clash of civilizations’ criticizes the term 
Universality of human rights values and assumes that they are product of Western 
societies; therefore its universality is bound to fail. For instance Huntington puts that 
“human rights-as well as democracy, liberalism, and political secularism-belong exclusively 
to Western civilization” (as quoted in Bielefeldt 2000:91). Further, he argues that for 
people from other societies the only way to have access to these values is adopting 
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Western and converts to norms of Western civilization (Bielefeldt 2000:91). Bassam Tibi 
() defends the idea that the West has a global mission to fulfill. He refers to the metaphor 
of ‘cunning of reason’ and puts that “It was, as it were, a byproduct of the European 
conquest of the world, a byproduct in the sense of the Hegelian 'cunning of reason,' that the 
European cultural heritage has been disseminated; and human rights constitute a crucial 
component of that heritage” (as quoted in Bielefeldt 2000:91).  
To understand the defensive policies of IRI towards adaptation of human rights values 
one needs to study it based on the Islamic nature of the regime. Basically, from the 
Islamic critic assumption the universal human rights values are one-sided concept 
created by "Western" philosophy, while the Islamic conceptualization of human rights is 
primarily based on the Qur'an and the tradition of the prophet Muhammad (Bielefeldt 
2000:91). Therefore, conservative Islamists groups in Iran and those who opponent to 
modernity and adoption of good governance- and human rights values argue that the 
process of modernity and employing these values  is a “Western cultural invasion” in 
Iran and the Islamic world (Jahanbegloo 2004:10). The Spiritual Leader Ayatollah Ali 
Khamenei was against reformists’ desire –especially during the presidency of Khatami –
for democratizing the Iranian political system and adopting human rights values to 
Iranian constitution by claiming that “Democracy and liberalism both which are inspired 
by Western culture must not become encrusted in the foundation of the Islamic 
regime”(Takeyh 2003:44).  
 
By studying the literature of Islam one can realize that there are some gaps between the 
limits of tolerance and accountability in the Quran and Hadith and internationally 
standards for human rights. The status of women and religious freedom are often the 
two key areas of contention. Reading women’s position in society and family inequality 
of men and women is clearly expressed in Islamic law. Exceeding the defined religious 
freedom and questioning the sacred values may be resulted in being condemned as 
apostasy what may result in death as punishment. “In a literalist reading of Islam there 
are little room for negotiate human rights…”(Akbarzadeh &MacQueen 2008:1). Mainly, 
the literature of Islam’s opinion in adopting and interpreting universal human right 
values can be characterized as two distinct and contradicting arguments.  On the one 
hand some Muslim traditional leaders have a hostile view toward the idea of the 
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universal human rights values, and construe it as nothing more than an instrument for 
neo-colonial power for intervening in the Muslim world, and finally these values were 
seen as contravening the Shari’a (Akbarzadeh &MacQueen 2008:1). 
Bernard Lewis and Danial Pipes claim that Islam contradicts modern human rights 
values and conventions. They put that “there is an inherent resistance to democratic 
governance as the notion of a ‘corporate or majority decision’ through electoral means is 
an ‘alien’ concept in many Islamic societies, with violent contestations, in this view sees as 
the norm” (as quoted in Akbarzadeh &MacQueen 2008:2). The Islamic communities 
mostly believe in the human rights that are defined by the religion. Regarding the way 
human rights are perceived –in terms of moralities and their worldly nature – many 
differences can be identified between the perspective that holds human rights as 
universal and the Islamic perspective that has its roots in religion. Islamic human rights 
particularly primes “a society of believers in which peace and correlation is possible. An 
individual is just one, among many believers, who can achieve his entitled rights though 
Islamic laws and values” (Davoodifard 2011:129). 
There is this doubt about coexistability of Islam with other beliefs and ideologies. This is 
more possible if religion be matter of individual’s personal beliefs and peaceful 
communities. However, when values of specific religion –whether Islam or any other 
religion –turns to be the core values of governing and political system, then it tries to 
win its everlasting superiority to other religions, beliefs and ideologies.  
Political Islam and Islamic law (the Shari’a) as a governing system has been criticized for 
the way it considers human rights, International law and values of modern civilized 
society. There is this critique that, political system in many Islamic states is 
characterized by “a lack of constitutionalism, abuse of power, political manipulation and 
violation of human rights” (Rehman & Breau 2007:4), Jihad as an Islamic ideology 
advocates fight against non-believers and whoever stand against words of God. This 
view of conservative Muslims has been equated with aggression and fanaticism; because 
it challenges the free will of non-Muslim communities in the Islamic countries. The  
“human rights in Islam are an integral part of the overall Islamic order and it is obligatory 
on all Muslim governments and organs of society to implement them in letter and in spirit 
within the framework of that order” (Rehman & Breau 2007:161). Therefore, this is only 
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the Islamic values that are legitimate to be practiced, and not the secular values of the 
West. In this regard, Cruise O’Brien depicts the Muslim society as following:  
“Muslim society looks profoundly repulsive… A western who claims to admire Muslim 
society, will still adhering to western values, is either a hypocrite or an ignoramus, or a 
bit of both… Arab and Muslim society is sick, and has been sick for a long time”  (as 
quoted in Rehman & Breau 2007:5). 
IRI, as an Islamic regime, also has been unwilling to accept the universal validity of the 
human rights. The universal perspective of human rights challenges the less  democratic 
governments like IRI. These regimes give priority to cultural relativism perspective and 
Islamic criteria in their human rights understanding (Davoodifard 2011:126). In such a 
society individual’s demand for secular western human rights is a taboo. The problem of 
conservative states then would be the global recognition of the human rights values as 
respect for the human rights values and their implementations have become important 
factors for achieving international legitimacy of the state. By turning the human rights 
values global, this anxiety has raised in Islamic community of Iran that the activities of 
human rights organizations might challenge the IRI’s perspective of human rights and 
consequently its political stability (Davoodifard 2011:134-136). 
Human Rights and Cultural Relativism 
Susan C. Breau says that cultural relativism is the major threat that challenges the 
effectiveness, legitimacy and universality of human rights. Briefly, based on Cultural 
Relativist view;  
“what we call ‘universal’ human rights are… an expression above all of Western values 
derived from the Enlightenment. Understood in this right, the human right idea is at 
best misguided in its core claim that it embodies universal values – and at worst a 
blend of moral hubris and cultural imperialism” (Rehman & Breau 2007:137).  
 
The Cultural Relativist believe that differentiated cultures and values can exist 
peacefully side by side; in this regard cultural traditions and religious beliefs should 
be considered when human rights are defined and introduced (Davoodifard 
2011:129). Such arguments can be traced in the slogans of regime, one of which is 
‘neither the West nor the East, but Islamic republic of Iran’, that emphasizes the 
differentiation of realities and values of the Iranians in general.     
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However, the implementation of human rights by individuals in Islamic societies 
raises the issue of apostasy.  The followers of other religions might not enjoy full and 
equal [citizenship] rights. The deviation between religion and human rights lies in two 
issues: Human rights reflect and focus on individualism while religion celebrates the 
community practices.  Following An -Na’mi Islam is an extremely complex and 
multifaceted religion; the Islamic law –Sharia– has been interpreted differently by 
Islamic communities and as a result different sects have emerged (as quoted in 
Rehman & Breau 2007:142). Although, different Islamic sects defend their specific 
religious realities, they almost have a common understanding of Islamic human  
rights, especially when it comes to the women’s rights. 
The human rights is a worthwhile system aiming protection of individuals, but Islam 
is a system of belief that doesn’t compromise’ with secular human rights. 
Furthermore, Islamic elites consider the existence of universal as a threat to Islamic 
rights.“Human rights in Islam are privilege of Allah, because authority ultimately 
belongs to him” (Rehman & Breau 2007: 170).  Islamic human rights have their roots 
in Sacred and are regarded as the attribute of God; they cannot exist outside the 
religious framework and they are envisaged only through their relation to God. 
Therefore, an individual can have salvation if he attempts to lead a good Muslim life. 
The Islamic human rights is not about providing individuals guaranteed and  good 
worldly life, but the rules and values are to protect people from themselves and each 
other, through separation and stringent moral prohibition –a system that relies on 
‘the fear of God and threat of punishment’(Rehman & Breau 2007:170-171). 
Contrary to universal human rights values, in Islam the interest and right of 
individuals are overshadowed by the community’s interests. The Islamic community 
is organized around the interest of the ummah or ‘community of believers’. The goals 
of Ummah is superior to individuals interests, and for the well being of the ummah, 
the individuals have to obey God’s will; therefore, the individuals’ free will and rights 
comes secondary (Rehman & Breau 2007:173). The IRI human rights are based on 
the well-being of individuals for the sake of Ummah of Iran. As mentioned in the 
previous section Iranians in general have been called and referred by IRI spokesmen 
as Islamic Ummah. 
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 The universal of human rights has been questioned for being constructed by the 
Western societies: “since all normative systems are necessarily a product of cultural 
and contextual specificity, how can there be a universal agreement on a normative 
system for human rights in a world of serious and permanent diversity?” (Rehman & 
Breau 2007:177). An- Na’im states that attempting for a universal implementation of 
human rights is not only depending on their uniform application but a substantive 
measure of legitimacy, understanding and taking to account of peoples’ own culture is 
some other precondition. The main sources of Islamic law are Qur’an the Holy Book of 
Islam, and Sunnah (words and lifestyle of Muhammad) (As quoted in Rehman & 
Breau 2007). Shari’a regulates all aspects of Muslims’ lives encompassing both 
private and public matters. The human rights values as a concept created by human 
being, and shari’a as the law and word of God in some aspects contradict each other. 
The incompatibility between two realms is apparent in Parliament and Judic iary 
denials in adapting and endorsing universal human rights values in to the 
constitution (Rehman & Breau 2007:179).     
Regarding the implementation of Islamic rules, Islamic law in Iran is different from 
the rest of the Muslim world. Since Iran is a Shi’i state, and ideologically sees itself in 
conflict with the Muslim Sunni states, there exists different views on how should the 
Islamic source of law be interpenetrated. However, the Islamic communities have one 
common idea on human rights, which is their pessimistic view on secular global 
human rights. 
Islam and the Human Rights  
Compared to the Universal human rights values, the paradigm and practices of Islamic 
human rights –in Islamic states –demonstrate a divers, bewildering and contradictory 
pictures of rights (Rehman & Breau 2007:13). These contradictions appear when it 
comes to discussing the concepts of sovereignty, democracy and free will of individuals. 
Audrey Guichon puts that “Under the classical interpretation of the Sharia, the 
Sovereignty as well as the authorization of rights to individuals remains a prerogative of 
Allah. Under this formula ‘Islamic human rights are envisaged through their relation to 
God…” (as quoted in Rehman & Breau 2007: 13). The Universal human rights 
emphasizes on ‘common standard of achievement for all people and all nations’ (Ibid: 33). 
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 According to Rhoda Howard the Universal human rights values have faced five 
ideological challenges: radical capitalism, traditionalism, reactionary conservatism, third 
world nationalism (left colonialism) and status radicalism (as quoted in Donnelly 2007: 
294); some of which can be identified in the case of the IRI. Notably, the IRI represents 
two of these challenges: that of ‘traditionalism’ and ‘Third World nationalism’. The 
central challenge that the IRI has represented to the universalities of human rights lies 
in the assertion that the Islamic values are the supreme cultural principles, more 
important than any ethical construct. As Islamic clergies preach, the decay of the Islamic 
values means the lost of Islamic Ummah from the path of salvation that might result 
wrath of God; being pessimistic about the impacts of universal human rights on Islamic 
values and societies, Khomeini states that “Islamic cultural norms were being corrupted 
by western style freedom, causing immorality in young men, and leading young women 
astray” (Afshari 2001:4). 
Regarding the term human rights, Islamists stress on human and not rights, which 
means that making sure that they first obtain a true  human being” mindful of God’s 
presence and fearful of divine injunction, before considering his right. Creating a Perfect 
human (ensan-e kamel) –which is in sharp contrast with the values of Western 
liberalism that aim to create a Normal human (ensan-e normal) –is the main idea in this 
Islamic understanding of human rights (Ashrefi 2001:5).      
Christine Chinkin (as cited at Rehman & Breau 2007) states that Islamists rejection of 
universal human rights values, is based on this argument that “human rights are a 
western construct imposed through a contemporary form of imperialism that rejects the 
particularities of other religions, cultures and traditions” (p.57). Abdullahi An-Na’mi also 
argues that  
“international human right norms are unlikely to be accepted by [Islamic] 
governments and respected in practice, without strong legitimating within national 
politics’ and this must include acceptance of human rights norms as being consistent 
with the religious believe of the population”  (as quoted in Rehman & Breau 
2007:140).  
This resistance of Islamic community in adapting global human rights norms is apparent 
in the policies of IRI. As argued before the IRI elites reject adaptation and 
implementation of such values due to differences in the nature of states and ideologies 
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of the nation.  People’s demand for democracy and human rights seems to be difficult in 
a country which constitution is based on sharia’. As this implementation of the human 
rights and liberal democracy problematize the legitimized biopolitics of the regime. This 
argument is apparent in the legal status of women in Iran, who cannot enjoy equal rights 
and freedom compared to the men.  As mentioned at the IRI Constitution “Article 1133 - 
A man can divorce his wife whenever he wishes to do so.”10 For instance, the women 
cannot get divorce easily if the male partner refuse to get divorce, but under few 
circumstances women can get divorce such as  ‘Castration’; Impotency, provided he has 
not even once performed the matrimonial act; “Amputation of the sexual organ to the 
extent that he is unable to perform his marital duty.”11 
3.3.2 IRI and Rights of The Citizens  
May be it is not an overstatement to say that in globalizing era we are witnessing 
transformation of states to the more democratic ones, mostly based on practicing the 
global human rights values, that are considered corner stone of Good Governance as 
well. In optimistic mode human rights as a post-war artifact is seen as “the triumph of 
civilization over realpolitik and barbarism” (Mazower 2004: 381)  
Legally citizenship can be defined as a relation between individual and territorial 
political entities, most importantly the states (Bauböck 2010: 848). Today’s 
understanding of citizenship with its definitions is differing with what one knew 
decades ago. This change is result of flows of market, technology and populations. 
Mainly the citizenship elements- such as rights and entitlements- are becoming 
reshaped with universalizing principles of neoliberalism and human rights  (Ong 2006: 
499). Conceptualizing Ong’s text, there are still societies like Iran that follow the old 
models of citizenship because they are not well developed as the ones in the Western 
world.  
This difference in type of citizenship in Iran and the West also indicate the differences in 
citizens’ possession of the rights. In the Western democratic societies, citizens’ security, 
their well-being and state of life, are mostly dependent on their own capabilities as free 
individuals to encounter globalized insecurities by calculating and investing proper ly in 
                                                                 
10 http://www.international-divorce.com/Iran-Family-Law.htm  Iran Family Law (accessed )  
11 Ibid 
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their lives, this citizenship is result of the shift toward a neoliberal form of governing 
(Ong 2006:501). The question is that, if this type of citizenship is applicable to society of 
Iran? This seems not, since it demands the consideration of equality of all citizens 
regardless of gender, race, language, etc. and freedom to express their beliefs- that is the 
slogan of Human Rights as well (Banchoff & Wuthnow 2011:2-3). Catherine Neveu 
provides various definitions of active and normal citizens; In one of the definitions, she 
defines an active citizen as one who votes, is active in public life, shows interest in 
politics and who does not rely on the welfare state, and attempts to promote the modern 
society. However, this needs autonomy of the citizens, to decide and plan for their lives  
(Neveu 2014:2-3). In this regards to be an active citizenship the state should be 
democratic and give freedom to individual and not to control them. These questions may 
rise that to what degree are Iranians free? Are minorities having the same citizenship 
rights and free to pursue their beliefs? And, are women regarded as equals to men? To 
say yes to the questions demands a true democratic state that is not focusing on one 
unquestionable truth but one that reflects and considers the realities of all individuals 
and communities. Nevertheless, In the IRI there is no sign of improvement in the areas-
such as women’s rights (UNHR 2014:2). Hence, to understand the stance of the IRI we 
need to seek the core rules and values of the regime that are derived from Islam. 
There are studies on whether Islam is compatible with human rights by viewing the 
limits of tolerance and acceptability of human rights in different Islamic societies. Within 
these studies two main issues are women and religious freedom (Akbarzadeh & 
MacQueen 2008:1). There is this belief that Quran and Hadith are unchangeable, if so 
then the status of woman pictured as inferior to man and socially with limited activities 
might not be conceived in the new context with human rights values in traditional 
Islamic communities. The problem is not then the practice of the Islamic values in the 
community and society but the freedoms of individuals to choose what satisfy them; this 
change the society from a united community with one picture, reflecting Islamic values, 
to a collage of beliefs and realities in a liberal and tolerant society that permits 
individuals to follow their interests, beliefs and traditions. Fear of decaying the Islamic 
values in encounter with the human rights values, provokes the conservative parties to 
resist reformations and to emphasize on regulation of Islamic values, that encompass 
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the limitation of women’s freedom in the name of enforcing Islamic values and morality 
(Akbarzadeh & MacQueen 2008:18) 
There might be ideological relations between Islam and Patriarchy; the resistance of IRI 
to adapt the human rights values is a patriarchal position to keep the power away from 
women. Although IRI seems to be democratic for the legislation of parliament but it is 
powerless in changing the rules has root in Islamic law. During Khatami’s presidency the 
parliament was in hand of majority reformists but they failed to make the rules more 
moderate due to Gardian Council veto power in blocking legislations that could  cause 
the slightest change to the status quo (Akbarzadeh & MacQueen 2008: 35). 
The differences in understanding the equality of human beings- woman and man- as 
well as in the legitimacy of the Theocratic regime are the main controversial issues 
concerning IRI. The reasoning of individuals’ equal rights in the context of Iran can be 
traced in Derridean theory of deconstruction. This theory defines the situation of a 
society in which one reality and the specific cultural values are regarded as a truth and 
the other realities of people and their values –mostly the marginalized people –are 
regarded as false or inappropriate. Referring to Derrida, in such a situation ‘ what if’ the 
other realities and values –that have been rejected before –be practiced along the so-
called Truth-values? The second step is to imagine ‘what then’ would happen if everyone 
has equal rights and the realities of people be respected? This question can be followed 
by another question: will the theocratic regime in the assumed circumstances, still 
remain as the political system of the society? or will the edifice of the regime collapse?  
Referring to the deconstruction’s assumption of transcendental signified, the words of 
God— or Islamic law as the source of self-legitimacy of the Theocratic regime— that is a 
logocentric concept that provides “an ultimate meaning because it would be the origin of 
origins, reflecting itself and, as Derrida says, providing the reassuring end to the reference 
from sign to sign” (Bressler 2007:120) such a transcendental signified is supposed to be 
understood “without comparing to other signified and signifiers” as it is the truth. In this 
regards, Theocratic reasoning of IRI has a logocentric concern that is independent and 
self-originating. Theocracy in this regards points to the existence of an ultimate reality or 
center of truth “that can serve as the basis for citizens’ thoughts and actions “(Bressler 
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2007:120), so Shi’ism, as the soul of the ideologies of the regime, functions as the center 
of meaning based on which people construct their realities.  
Furthermore, based on system of binary operations, establishment of an absolute center 
means the decentering of another. So, one element will always be superior (Words of 
God and man) and the other inferior (decision and rights of citizens, and woman) 
(Bressler 2007:121).  
Since the superiority of Men in the society of Iran is part of Socio-political policies of IRI, 
then by assuming the equality of men and women in society the patriarchal values of the 
regime will be decentered. Decentering the patriarchal values undermines the Islamic 
values that are gender based, so the Theocratic regime that has the patriarchal 
perspective of Islamic law –as it is the male clergies are allowed to interpret the Quran 
and Islamic texts –will be challenged if equal human rights be adapted and implemented. 
The contradictory arguments are: the Islamic and patriarchal regimes consider the 
gender rules and values as a matter of nature of ‘man and woman’, while the Feminists 
argue that defining ‘what it means to be man or woman’, is product of society and 
culture (Bressler 2007:256). The Queer theory that is influenced by Derridean thoughts 
rejects the superiority of men in society has the similar argument. By emphasizing on 
the concept of différance and by reversing the binary operation of presence/absence, 
Derrida argues that, “we can no longer posit a transcendental signified. No longer is there 
an absolute standard or coherent unity from which knowledge proceeds and develops” 
(Bressler 2007:125). By adopting Derrida’s theoretical concepts, Queer Theory began 
“to debunk the idea that a person’s identity is stable or fixed at birth”(Ibid: 256). Kate 
Millet asserts in Sexual Politics (1969), “a female is born, but a woman is created” (Ibid) 
sex is a biological matter, but gender is constructed in society. Contrariwise , Ayatollah 
Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of IRI, on April 19 th rejects the equality of man and 
woman in society and asserts that ‘such equality is a Western concept that is a result of 
materialistic and unholy view of the West to the universe and existence’, he then 
emphasizes on the nature of woman (being female) that determines the defined roles 
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she can take in society (BBCPersian 2014A)  12. Although President Rohani added later 
that woman and man are equal in Iran, but it is the Supreme Leader that decides for 
general strategies and policies of the regime and not the President.  
IRI Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, whose words are considered as the main and 
the final decision of the regime, told on April 19 th that the equality of men and women is 
a western notion and must not be considered in social and political context of Iran. He 
stated that working is not the main duty of the women but is the family. He continued by 
saying that the social limitations and differences should not be considered as 
discrimination since the nature of woman is different from man in taking 
responsibilities (BBCPersian 2014B) 13 . This speech is in sharp contrast with Queer 
theory based on which human rights and feminist activist claim that our identities are 
constructed socially and one’s rights should not be based on their sexuality ‘ the nature’ 
(Bressler  2007:263). 
In modern societies women are expected to have their own impacts on values and 
norms of the society. The Women play an important role in the developmental progress 
of a state and society, which their roles cannot be ignored any more. Traditionally in 
many societies women had been subjected to discrimination that left huge negative 
impact in respecting woman culturally, socially and politically. Therefore the promotion 
and protection of women’s rights became an important aspect of international human 
rights discourse. However, Muslim societies mostly have ignored such equal rights for 
women. The Islamic law and culture have often been selectively and practically applied 
to restrict women’s rights. Mashood A. Baderin states that “… Islamic law and culture 
have generally never been static but have, in fact, been evolutionary and responding to 
modernity and changes in most Muslim societies, albeit to the advantage of men” (as 
quoted in Rehman & Breau 2007:349). The IRI regime also in practice, if not in words, 
ignores such equal rights for women. First of all legislations responsibility and 
protections of the rules are patriarchal; it is only the men who are allowed to interpret 
Islamic law; “Women in the IRI and under Sharia-based government do not enjoy equal 
                                                                 
12 http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2014/04/140421_iran-women-rohani-khamenei-amini-
radio.shtml Inconsistency of the statements of Supreme leader and President Rohani on woman and 
employment (in Persian) (accessed April 27, 2014)  
13http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2014/04/140419_l57_khamenei_women.shtml   
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rights” (Freedomhouse 2103:7). The Islamic constitution regard a woman’s value half of 
a man’s, and with regard to inter alia, evidence, qisas (retaliation) and diya (blood-
money), the Islamic criminal law treats men and women differently, for example the 
testimony of a man has twice more trustable of that of a woman, and “The diya (blood-
money) for murdering a woman is half that of a man” (IHRDC 2014:4).  
According to aforesaid, it seems women are categorizing as second-class citizens by 
Islamic regimes of Iran. Mayer argues that “Muslim like Iran’s ruling clerical elite, who 
cling to ideas grounded in medieval jurisprudence or misogynist Islamist views, naturally 
reject the model of equal rights for women” (Akbarzadeh &MacQueen 2008:15). Although 
there has been some reformations based on the human rights values in the last two 
decades in Iran, but it may be understood as one step forward and two back. These 
uneven processes of change and reform take place depending on the political situation 
and the power construction in Iran. For instance, who be the president is one of those 
dependent elements for change in direction of the politics and particularly progress in 
acceptance of human rights values (Mavani 2011& Amuzegar 2003).  
Recent documents and reports from International human rights organizations –for 
example UNHR –show dissatisfactory human rights situation and criticize the regime for 
being unwilling to corporate with these organizations.14 The IHRDC underline that the 
new Islamic Penal Code (IPC) does incorporate some reforms, but the regime’s source of 
law –the shari’a –is one of those obstacles for adapting and implementing the equal 
human rights values in Iran. The conservative groups as well, among them the Supreme 
Leader and Guardian Council, have constantly blocked reforms regarding improvement 
of human rights situation in Iran. Following is an example for how conservatives 
hindering reforms for human rights: 
“After the Guardian Council gave its final approval of the new IPC on January 18, 2012 
and the new IPC was sent for approval of the President, the Guardian Council abruptly 
stopped the process and returned the new IPC text to the start of the decision-making 
process—on the basis that further amendments were needed. The halt in the process 
was an unprecedented move which observers note may have come about from a 
belated realization on the part of the drafters that the omission of stoning from the 
language of the amended IPC could lead to the interpretation that such a punishment 
had been abolished”. The revisiting of the IPC resulted in several additional changes in 
the IPC including stipulation of stoning to death as the punishment for zina-ye-
                                                                 
14  http://www.iranhrdc.org/ IHRDC's Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review  
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mohsaneh. These events reflect how resistant the Guardian Council can be in adopting 
reforms of Islamic Shari’a rules (IHRDC 2014:3). 
 
Another example addresses abolishment of stoning while the Council Guardian argues 
for maintaining the law of stoning. The Guardian Council claims that the omission of 
stoning was against Islamic Shari’a and that it should be stipulated in the IPC. Hence, 
despite its initial approval of the amended IPC, the Parliament excluded this provision, 
conceded this point and changed the article 225 accordingly by repeating the old rule of 
punishment for adultery (zina-ye-mohsaneh). Such a punishment is in contradiction to 
commendation of the international community (IHRDC 2014:3). Therefore, although the 
international human rights for women offer Iranian women a notion of gender equality 
that may exist, it seems to be difficult to achieve this equality in the Islamic paradigm 
(Akbarzadeh & MacQueen 2008: 51). 
The Rights of Minorities 
There is no doubt in the importance of Human Rights in advocating and giving voice to 
minorities in different societies of the world and obliging the dictator states to consider 
the rights of the individuals as human beings since, “the real safety of minorities rest 
upon a clear enunciation and defence of human fundamental and democratic rights, and 
not of particular national rights” (Mazower 2004: 388) in spite of the claim of the regime 
that there is no discrimination on minorities’ rights of citizensh ip, we can see it is the 
opposite. The Human Rights’ report reflects that in addition to the limitations of the 
rights in freedom of speech, gathering and association for members of religious 
minorities such as Baha’i, Christian and Sunni Muslims, they are  subjected to different 
forms of legal discrimination as well as in employment and education. This reminds the 
Agamben’s argument that the logic that binds sovereignty, the sacred, and biopolitics 
together runs a supreme power that can crush a whole minority in term of national 
unity (as quoted in Connolly 2007:27). On the contrary side regime reject this 
declaration. Fatemeh Rahbar, head of the Parliament’s Women Fraction claims that the 
Western propaganda on the discrimination of minorities’ rights in Iran is unfair and 
phony. 15 Yunaten Bet Kelia, representative of the Assyrian and Chaldean communities 
in the IRI parliament, also rejects the violation of the religious minorities’ rights in Iran. 
                                                                 
15 http://www.humanrights-iran.ir/news-38107.aspx in Persian 
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He continues, the only state, which constitution considers lots of freedom and autonomy 
for religious minorities is Iran [!].16 
 Unlike the situation in Iran, citizens of democratic states are largely governed through 
individual freedom. Democratic governments are not concerned in taking care of every 
citizen any more, but want them to act as a free subject who self-actualizes and relies on 
independent action to face globalized insecurities. Therefore, there is a shift in the ethics 
of citizenship or subject formation as governing deals less with the social controlling of 
the people (biopolitics) than with individual self-determining (ethico- politics) (Ong 
2006:501).   
Rousseau believed that if democratic society was to maintain itself, the element of 
arbitrariness in its formation and maintenance had to be obscure to those who were its 
objects.  Because to accept being the object of sovereignty, the best is, individuals regard 
themselves as the subject or agent of sovereignty (as quoted in Connolly 2007:25) In 
this regards it seems that a state like IRI challenges in achieving its legitimacy based on 
the democratic values defined by human rights values and western standards, while IRI 
established in 1979 based on Islamic values as the majority voted for Islamic 
governance. The change in the taste of Iranians- the popular taste- as a result of impacts 
of globalization and human rights activities turns the majority of citizens to compare 
their situation with other societies and cultures. The broadcasting of great numbers of 
media may enflame this sense of regarding themselves as global citizen. People then 
might begin to feel as an object of the state and not the subject to it due to lack of 
individual freedom and equality in Iran; their fascination to glamorous western and 
global liberal values; and their inability to change the social and political norms and 
structures in Iran. The IRI governs them not based on the new forming values associated 
with global human rights but based on the religious ideologies and traditions that are 
now unattractive and do not content them anymore. 
By raising the question that whether we have entered a post-statist world order, Clunan 
and Trinkunas argue that: “Leading states have sought to promote economic liberalization 
                                                                 
16 http://irna.ir/en/News/80461794 Assyrian MP: Shaheed claims on violation of Iran religious minority 
rights basel ess 
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and democratization as global goods, but ironically, these very efforts have helped open 
spaces for non-state actors to contest state authority” (Clunan and Trinkunas 2010:27). 
So, by providing a standard form of governance with defined standard features, the 
states that do not adapt to these international standards might be regarded not as states 
with good governance; consequently they might be regarded as violator of the citizens’ 
rights who deserve to have good government. In this regards regimes are expected to be 
providers of the citizens’ will democratically , and not just obliging citizens to accept the 
unquestionable truth ideologies. So the IRI has to reform the rules and values of society 
based on the contemporary demands of the people and not to practice the values that 
were once the demands of the Iranian generation in 1979 who voted for Islamic rules 
and values. As it is apparent, each generation’s worldview might differ from the former 
ones and it is not fair to live with old-fashioned realities that do not satisfy the new 
generations and cannot provide their demands. 
If state-citizenship is a treaty between the society and the regime then these are the 
society and the citizens that democratically decide how ought to be the structures and 
governing rules of the state. “The state’s inability or unwillingness to provide personal and 
economic security may lead citizens to turn to non-state actors to provide such security” 
(Clunan and Trinkunas 2010:26); in another view, globalization, with the essence of 
liberalization, has caused further spread of modern democratic values that resulted in 
the weakening of the state’s power while has empowered non-state actors in a way they 
exercise quasi-sovereign authority over the individuals within the states’ domain. This 
might be acceptable to say, “the weakness of the state and its legitimacy and ability to 
provide security and welfare has led citizens to the western liberal international order” 
(Clunan and Trinkunas 2010:27); In case of Iran the defensive manner of the regime 
might be for the fear of loosening the religious and cultural beliefs of citizens, based on 
which regime gets its legitimacy. Regime is theocratic and seems it doesn’t want to 
change the system based on the ‘Good Government’ model and therefore the only way is 
to satisfy or manipulate the citizens through its hegemonic production and reproduction 
values and restricting the broadcasting of the western human right values in IRI’s 
domain and by increasing its power- military, economic or ideological- to secure more 
its legitimacy in the clash of the state’s hegemon with the contrary ones. The IRI state, in 
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this regards, creates its counter discourse in order to stand against and at the same time 
question the challenges of the global human rights values.  
According to IHRD in the IRI and in accordance to Article 13 of the Constitution only 
Christian, Jewish and Zoroastrian Iranians have been recognized as non -Muslim 
religious minorities in Iran, while other religious communities –for example such as 
Baha’is, Sufis, Mandanis –have not been recognized as religions (IHRD 2014:6). The 
situation is even less favorable when it comes to non-believers, atheists, and those who 
have converted from Islam. This is while under international human rights law, the term 
‘religious minorities’ covers all religions and beliefs held by minority parts of the 
population. In this regard and as a result of this discriminating policy “if a Muslim kills a 
Baha’i, qisas (retaliation) is not possible, nor can the victim’s heirs claim blood money”  
(IHRDC 2014:6). Non-recognized religious minority communities are excluded from 
access to many social goods, among them education. The population of Iranian Baha’i is 
estimated to be between 300,000 and 350,000. They virtually enjoy no rights under the 
state’s law, and are banned from practicing their faith. During the last third decades they 
often have been persecuted by the regimes security forces.  
“Baha’i students are barred from attending university and prevented from obtaining 
their educational records. Because of the persecution have many of the Iranian Baha’i 
community forged to fled from Iran and seek for asylum in other country, among them 
USA” (Freedomhouse 2013:4-5).     
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Chapter 4: Discussion 
Through our analysis we realized that many aspects of the human rights have been 
violated by the IRI in Iran. As it is apparent from the analysis, conducting sustainable 
political reform as well as adapting and implementing the values of the human rights 
less or more challenge the IRI’s legitimacy. The violation of the individuals’ social and 
political rights in many aspects –such as women’s rights and the ethnic and religious 
minorities’ rights –are so dissatisfactory that many voices have raised not just in Iran 
but also all over the world questioning the regime’s policy towards citizens. Since the 
establishment of IRI, the Iranian people have witnessed the extensive intervention of 
the regime in many affairs of the society while the IRI forces have been stifling all 
opposing voices.    
We believe that conducting and implementing socio- political reforms based on the 
human rights values in the Islamic regime of Iran has become a difficult or better to say 
impossible process. There are different reasons that these reformations have not 
succeeded and human rights have been continuously violated. Based on our analysis, 
understanding two main issues can contribute to explain the complexity of the 
democratic reformations and continuous violation of the human rights in Iran. 
First, due to the IRI’s political and institutional structure, comprehensive and long -term 
social and political reforms are impossible.  In the IRI, the main political and 
institutional positions that seek the regime’s safety are controlled and  dominated by the 
Supreme Leader or institutions under his direct and indirect supervision. They –the 
Supreme Leader and the elites of his trusted circle –apparently oppose any reforms and 
activities that endanger values and interests of IRI. Even if a president attempts to 
conduct reforms that give individuals more freedom –for example in the presidency of 
Khatami –conservative groups of authorities oppose reformations and make the 
process impossible. One example for the regimes unwillingness to accept socio- and 
political reform is the so-called ‘Chain or Serial Murders in Iran’ from the early 
foundation of the Islamic Republic to 1999. During this period the IRI’s Intelligent 
Service (Ettela'at) conducted a series of murders and kidnapping of opposing 
intellectuals who were criticizing the IRI’s policies.  
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Based on our study the IRI’s conservative groups and organizations (bonyads) –with 
close link to the Supreme Leader –all together serve the regime’s interests and are the 
protectors of it. These bonyads –which are established by the regime and are 
independent from government–during their activities, play a crucial role in securing the 
lifetime of the IRI. If any president seeks less difficulty in the system of the IRI, the 
support of these bonyads and conservative Islamist groups is a determinate factor for 
him. Otherwise, they avert the reformations. 
Second, Shari’a and Revolution’s ideology and values as the main foundations of the 
Islamic regime’s constitution are the only instruments in evaluating whe ther socio- 
political reforms and activities are in accordance with the interest of the regime. From 
our analysis we can see that the theocratic regime of Iran doesn’t allow the elected 
president and his government adapt and implement freely the human rights and good 
governance values. Adapting such values is on one hand in contradiction with Shari’a 
and Islamic values –which are the source of the legitimacy of the regime –and on other 
hand refusing to implement these values undermines the sovereignty and authority of 
the regime both internally and externally. The IRI claims that it has received legitimacy 
to rule through democratic election in 1980. By pass of the time and changing the taste 
of –people’s realities and cultural values –new generation because of globalization, the 
majority of the citizens seem not to have the same beliefs in the values that once gave 
legitimacy to the foundation of the regime. Now the challenge of the regime is that 
people, compare to past, have less respect to Islamic Revolution’s values. Furthermore, 
the theocratic regime policies do not fit the global secular political standards. In this 
regard, since the regime lacks the international respect because it cannot accept the 
global standard norms –human rights values –and can no more extend legitimately the 
state-nation contract to rule, the only way to survive is to suffocate the opposing voices 
and to continue resisting the forces of the UN’s Organizations and international human 
rights organizations for constructive reformation.  
Fear of complaining due to the harsh reaction of IRI forces, as well as the systematic 
and strong structures of the regime secured by Sepah –the regime’s loyal guard –on one 
hand and being pessimistic to the regime change by rising up –as the Iranians have the 
memory of the 1979 Revolution happened in the hope of having a better life and more 
social and political freedom –on the other hand, kept the majority of people silent, but 
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their only hope for reformation was through elections. Finally, in 2009 the majority of 
people voted for Mir-Hussein Mosavie in hope of having constructive reformations. 
However, the suspecting of fraud in 2009 election caused the Green Movement that led 
to harsh reactions of regime’s police forces. This event and the similar o nes have 
declined internal legitimacy and international respect for the regime. 
Therefore, lack of social and political reforms that people demand; violation of the 
rights of the citizens by the IRI; and emergence of political instability and dissatisfaction 
of people could be regarded as the signs of the regime’s decay of legitimacy. These 
elements all together or separately threaten the future of the IRI.  
The fair and equal human rights values is not a new issue for Iranians, as historically 
such equal rights used to be practiced –e.g. Cyrus Charter. Although the IRI has tried to 
vanish this reality from historical memories of Iranian, still they feel proud of it. Cyrus 
Charter is on the individual’s rights and freedom can be considered as the first human 
rights charter in the world. Cyrus –was the king of Iran during 520-580 B.C. –in regard 
to the individual’s rights stated that:  
“I would never let anyone, as long as I am the king, take over others’ properties and 
possessions by the means of force and without making a full payment. And to the day I 
live, I prevent any forced and unpaid labour. Today, I announce that everyone is free to 
choose a religion he likes. People can live freely wherever they want and are free to 
choose any career without violating other people’s rights”( Davoodifard 2011:126 ). 
In present Iran, being disappointed from Shi’i values and conservative rules we can see 
among the new generations, some Iranians reproduce the thoughts and values used to 
be practiced during the Achaemenid and pre-Islamic Iran period.     
Cyrus’s statement for human rights indicates that the belief of human beings’ equality 
has historical roots in the political system of ancient Iran –including the freedom of 
religion, property rights and freedom of speech. As can be traced in the Jewish Bible 
Cyrus is represented as ‘Messiha’ means releaser of Jews from slavery in the historical 
city-state of Babylon that can be regarded as a proof to the practice of the Cyrus’s 
Article as a law. 
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These beliefs of the human beings equality are also reflected in the literature of the 
post-Islamic Iran. The prominent one that we can point to is Sadi’s (1188-1283) famous 
poem that written on the entrance of the Hall of Nations of the United Nations building 
in New York City: 
Human beings are members of a whole, 
In creation of one essence and soul. 
If one member is afflicted with pain, 
Other members uneasy will remain. 
If you have no sympathy for human pain, 
The name of human you cannot retain 
(Bustan Sa’adi)17 
 
Based on the aforesaid we can trace the equal human rights values both through the 
Persian history and literature. Therefore, this claim –of the Supreme Leader and some 
of the Postcolonial critics –that equal rights are result of the Western minds might not 
relevant to Iranians’ understanding of such rights. As mentioned before Ayatollah 
Khamenei calls the human rights values products of the Western minds that should not 
be used in the social and political context of Iran; he claims this by highlighting the  
Islamic culture and Islamic identity of the Iranians and not the other collectivities. The 
statement of the Supreme Leader is in contrast with historically and literary 
understanding of human rights and self-understanding of the Iranians. This 
contradiction between the historical evidences and the IRI’s reflection of what it means 
to be Iranian can be assumed in the regimes attempts in reproducing and reforming 
Iranians identity based on Shi’i Islamic values.  
As we discussed in the first section of the Analysis, ‘to be Iranian’ was not based on 
religious collective identity before the IRI. Even historically, before the establishment of 
the IRI ‘being Muslim’ was not defined as part of the Iranian national identity. After 
Arabs’ invasion to Iran in seventh century the Islam was not accepted by Iranians, as it 
was presented to them; the Iranians, based on their world views and cultural values, 
redefined Islam differently – e.g. Shi’i sect and Sufism.  
                                                                 
17 http://www.zaufishan.co.uk/2011/09/iranian-poetry-bani-adam-inscribed-on.html (accessed on 
1.5.2014 )  
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The Islamic regime’s rejection of the human rights values and their avoidance to adopt 
these values are due to this claim that the human rights values are used as an 
instrument by the Western powers to intervene the internal affairs of the IRI and to 
ruin the Islamic-Iranian culture. Further, it is claimed that Shari’a represent God’s word 
and holds the answers for all socio- political aspects of governance and everyday life of 
individuals. Supplying God’s words by manmade rules and values, questions the Truth 
that is reflected in Shari’a. Furthermore, the regime’s refrain to adapt and implement 
the globally accepted human rights values decline both its international respect and 
national legitimacy. 
However, in our view the regime’s anxiety is that not only the adaptation of the said 
values would contradict Shari’a but also is an obstacle for the IRI’s hegemony to control 
people and form their beliefs and cultural values, which consequently result in change 
of the tastes of individuals and their respect for Islamic regime. Therefore, the regime’s 
resistance to adapt and implement human rights values seems to be more rational for 
prolonging the life of the IRI. 
If one looks at the Islamic constitution, it points out that all Iranian citizens are equal by 
law and have same social and political rights in the society. But the claim for equal right 
is delimited when it comes to practice and especially when it comes to gender and 
religious minorities. Not every Iranian citizen has the opportunity to hold high political 
position in the regime –for instance to become a ‘Minister’ –as the precondition is 
belonging to the Shi’i sect. So, priority of Shi’i beliefs and loyalty to the IRI’s ideologies 
are the main determining factors to possess a socio-political hierarchy.    
Iran is a multi ethnic society with main seven ethnic groups –Persian, Azeris, Kurds, 
Baloch, Lors, Arabs and Turkmen. Considering religious diversity in Iran the majority is 
Shia and the minorities are Sunnis, Zoroastrians, Christian, Jewish, Bahai’is, Sufies, etc. 
If the regime, as it claims, was democratic it had to give equal socio-political rights to 
the aforementioned minorities, but suffocation of the voices and oppression of these 
marginalized groups is the evidence for the undemocratic nature of the IRI. As we 
discussed if regime wanted to regard the citizens equally –regardless of ethnicity and 
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religion –then the minorities’ interests to participate in political sphere would increase. 
Therefore in such a system theocratic Shi’i regime might not exist.     
During the 1979 Revolution Khomeini as a charismatic person became a symbolic 
leader to unite the oppositions against Shah, but for establishing the new political 
system, he was not regarded as the leader of all parties. After the succession of the 
Revolution all political parties tended to be included and allowed in the political 
activities. However, the conservative clergies and likeminded groups took the control of 
the essential positions; the Revolution that was aimed to be for freedom of speech and 
equality of individuals, changed its subject to Islamic Revolution, it was then that 
happened a vast process of exclusion and assassinations of the former regime’s 
authorities and –such as assassination of Dr. Bakhtiyar – and the leaders of competitive 
parties. The authoritative clergies, by provoking the people’s emissions for religious 
values, succeeded to centralize themselves in the circle of power and excluded the other 
parties who began to question the governing legitimacy of the clergies. Regime, for 
justifying its policy, labelled opponents as enemies of Islam, who were agents of the 
Western imperialism. This policy of gaining legitimacy by revealing the West as old 
enemy of the IRI and ‘Islamic Ummah of Iran’ still is the main tool to gain national 
legitimacy and to suffocate the regime’s opposing voices.   
In the modern world citizens demand a government that performs based on their will 
and not autocratically. Individuals no more show respect to dictators. They expect to be 
involved in the process of policy making of the government and be aware of how the 
regime protects the desired values of the society. Today an ideal government is the one 
that provides a social and political context in which individuals see the policies of the 
government as reflection of their decisions, and citizens can justify the goals of the 
government to be for satisfaction, security and convenience of the nation. But based on 
our view the IRI lacks the features of such an ideal government by which one’s dream 
could come true based on his interest, talent and attempt.  
By the expansion of the activities of the Human Rights Organizations and by achieving 
more international legitimacy human rights have turned to be the advocate of 
individuals all over the world- regardless of their nationality, race, language, gender, 
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etc. Human rights values are now the rights that every individual deserves to have. 
Thanks to the human rights activists the violations of the rights by autocratic regimes 
don’t remain unquestioned. The regimes and governments are responsible for their 
actions and policies, and they have to answer for their deeds. In spit of the resistance 
and ignorance of the IRI, Human Rights activities continued to force the state to apply 
political and social reformations based on the globally accepted norms of the human 
rights, practicing of which is now the main corner stone for evaluating the good 
governance- the democracy. By penetrating in to the social and political fields of Iran, 
the Human Rights gave voice to the marginalized people and oppressed individuals. 
Revealing of the realities and voices of the minorities and marginalized people –that 
contradict with the regime’s ideologies and values –can be regard as deconstructing 
process of the unquestionable logocentric terms –Islamic law, words of God and the 
Shi’i truth –glorified by the theocratic regime of Iran. Now state’s hegemonic circle of 
knowledge that has used to form the thoughts, believes and realities of people is in 
clash with the flourishing secular global values that are based on the individual’s 
freewill and not the community’s goals. The attraction of the Iranians to the global or 
the Western liberal values instead of admiring conservative standard values of the IRI, 
has led to weakening the foundations of the regime –its authority and legitimacy.  
Considering the aforesaid, it seems that Islamic institutions are not compatible with the 
practice of the human rights values in Iran. We assume that the compatibility of Islam 
and the human rights could be possible if religion was decentred from the circle of 
power institutions, so religion would be the individual’s personal matter – a type of 
secular society similar to India and not France. This demands withdraws of religious 
figures and Shi’a ideologies from the politics and constitution of the state.  
As argued in the analytical section, we consider that individuals’ claim of rights is 
mostly based on their self-understanding, the awareness of their opportunities, 
potentials, and expectations in comparison with other groups, communities or nations. 
Globalization as a phenomenon has afforded different nations to consider their states of 
lives and their social and political rights in comparison with the ones in developed 
democratic countries. So, it might not be surprising that –unlike decades ago –most of 
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the Iranians don’t have the same interests in the conservative religious ideologies and 
values.  
However, we think that the human rights as a package may itself work as a religion, the 
apparent difference with other religions then could be: it is not celestial but collection 
of secular values developed by the Western minds. Popularity of the human rights will 
push the constituted unequal religious values out of the constitutions of less democratic 
nations and encourage them to adapt and implement the ones prescribed by the Human 
Rights. The critique is that although, at least in theory by the support of the 
Superpowers traditional institutions of power as logocenters have been being 
decentred, the human rights it self paradoxically is turning to be a new unq uestionable 
centre, rejecting former ideologies and the traditional forms of human rights- the ones 
that are in sharp contrast with individual liberalism and equality of rights. In spite of 
the critiques, we cannot ignore the achievements of the Human Rights Organizations 
(UNHR, AI, and HRW) and the positive changes they have developed. In spite of the 
ignorance and defensive attitude of IRI, the Human Rights’ activities has given 
minorities and marginalized the courage to claim equal rights. If we consider  the 
situation of the women after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, they have been 
regarded as the second-class citizens –with less socio-political rights compared to men. 
Although woman still suffers from unfair rules of the IRI, the activities of th e Human 
Rights along with encouragement and forces of international communities has caused 
IRI to enhance some aspects of the woman’s social rights –such as education and job 
opportunities.  
As argued in the analysis, the theocratic regime of Iran has been suspected for 
undemocratic policies and rules since its foundation, which wondered us how such a 
regime with low degree of democracy has gained its legitimacy. Establishing all the 
governing aspects based on Shi’i Islamic values and having constricted respect for the 
human rights on one hand and claim of the regime for being democratic and setting the 
social rules based on the wills of Iranians on the other hand, seem contradictory to us. 
Based on our studies, to be Iranian as a self-understanding term varies in pre and post-
Islamic Revolution victory. This shift, we believe, is the result of penetration of the 
religious and the Revolution’s values in political and social fields of Iran. After the 
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Islamic Revolution, religion became more institutionalized as a logocentric matter and 
began to play important roles in articulating the Islamic ideologies and religious field of 
knowledge. Reviewing the speeches of the Islamic Revolution Leaders especially 
Ayatollah Khomeini- the Supreme Leader of the time- they vowed if people voted for 
the establishment of the Islamic regime, the minorities would have equal rights; 
individuals would have free will; and people could hold their believes. However, by 
establishment of IRI and by growing the power of Shi’i clergies in  political institutions, 
the IRI elites reconstructed the state’s politics, constitution, economy and other fields 
based on Shi’ism and the Revolution’s values; in this regards the cultural and social 
norms were not exceptions. These changes quashed the vo ws of the Islamic leaders 
during the Revolution and before the establishment of the Islamic regime. Hence, the 
Islamic authorities formed a conservative governing structure protected by newly 
formed regime’s guard ‘Sepah’ that continuously oppressed minorities, ignored 
individual’s will and suffocated the voices of oppositions. 
The roles of superpowers are significant in the development and expansion of the 
human rights, as well as encouraging and in some aspects forcing other states to have 
political and social reformations based on the standard values. For us, the support of 
the Human Rights by the super powers has paradoxical intentions and consequences. 
Their support has resulted in empowerment and expansion of the UN’s Organizations, 
prominently the Human Rights, that caused the less democratic and authoritarian 
regimes to consider the rights of the marginalized and minorities. But the consequence 
of building this utopian edifice are the increasing influences and interferences of the 
supporters of the UN’s Organizations in the weaker states, as they follow their interests 
in international relations. So by decolonization of self from the autocracy of regimes –to 
be self-ruled and have free will – the states will be monitored by the global 
organizations and will be under influence of the great powers— What postcolonial 
critics call ‘Neocolnization,’ as a new period in the history of Imperialism. This may be 
one of the IRI’s reasons for refusing to accept the Western democratic values and 
human rights’ values as a package. As a matter of fact, this resistance has brought the 
IRI international distrust and sanctions, which both has weakened the regime and 
troubled the people financially. 
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A probable clarification for this accusation that the human rights is used as a tool by the 
superpowers, for fashioning the weaker regimes and the states policies, could be 
institutionalizing the human rights as a religion. So, instead of causing fast social and 
political change from above by the influence of the great powers, there would be 
gradual change from down without intrusion of any institutional powers. Although this 
might take decades or more to have a considerable conversions of individuals and 
occurrence of democratic reforms in the political and social structures, bu t the main 
realities and cultural values that form the identities and self-understanding of people 
could be maintained, so the cultural relativists critiques would be taken in 
consideration. 
If we look through the nationalist and anti-globalization perspective of states like Iran 
and by understanding the anxieties of conservative regimes the argument on their 
behalf could be as follow: the human rights’ emphasis on individualization of the selves 
weaken the individual’s commitment to practice traditional values that have roots in 
the community’s history. Before the globalization of the world, mankind has sought to 
satisfy the mysteries of the being in connection to past, through practice of the 
traditions and by glorifying the cultural values. How would be the understanding of the 
self if it be disconnected with past, history and the traditional values that has given 
meaning to the self of individual who has seen himself for the whole history of  man kind 
as part of the process of continuation of the prior generations and civilizations? My be 
this statement be true that nationalism once was the result of colonization but even if 
so this has turned to be a reality of the people! Questioning the cultural norms that 
make a nation unique –even if wrong in the eyes of the Western world –may turn the 
individuals of those communities to regard the life and the fact of being absurd and 
empty. The stratification of the world to first and the third both shows the differences 
in ideologies! The claim of the individuals to gain human rights values with no doubt is 
the revolution of the individuals against the long build social and cultural values; but 
prominently it is also the revolution of human rights and the superpowers that 
provided the course of this change. Whether we like it or not a considerable population 
in the world are Muslims. It is not the name of Islam that form the community but the 
practice of rules and values. The secular values of human rights that are inserted to the 
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body of the Islamic societies might gradually lead to breakdown of the religious rules 
and values.  
However preservation of cultural values and collectivities is one argument and the 
dictatorship of the regimes is another argument. This statement may be true that the 
dictators are claiming to protect the values that themselves are violating them. IRI’s 
elites claim IRI is republic and democratic; therefore, it should be the decision of people 
that form the policies of the state. As argued before IRI is claiming to protect the value 
that form people’s realities and self-understanding, but if the establishment of the 
regime was once the demand of the people in 1979, then they should be able to change 
the policies when their realities and values are changed. The fact is that the regime 
speaks on behalf of Iranians while the majority of people believe no more in the 
ideologies and conservative values of the IRI. Some of unequal rules of Islamic 
constitution; The suspicion of fraud in 2009 election; imprisonment of the opposing 
elites; unfair and cruel execution of considerable numbers of activists; chain of murders 
of the IRI critics especially before 1999; IRI’s consistency on the conservative policies 
such as nuclear program that caused heavy sanctions on Iran and left terrible affects on 
economic state and everyday lives of the individuals, and many other deficiencies has 
caused the people not  to trust in politics of the regime and not to hope for any positive 
reformation. 
In Iran the government’s main social and political decisions should not be out of a 
defined platform of the regime’s policies –in other words should be based on the 
Supreme Leader’s orders and not the nation’s desire –then there is a huge difference 
between what IRI’s elites define as democracy and the democracy people demand and 
deserve. The regime has problem with degree of individuals’ freedom; as the IRI has 
always tried to give freedom to the people, less than what it may put authority of the 
regime and the rulers in danger. During Khatami’s presidency to some extent degree of 
freedom raised, the standards of living improved and people felt more secured. These 
caused people’s interest to know more about the political situation of the country, and 
found more courage to question the dissatisfactory policies of the regime –such as those 
regarding the equal rights for women, freedom of speech and respecting the rights of 
religious minorities. During the Presidency of Ahmadinejad, individuals’ freedom began 
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to decrease. The persistence of the regime on accessing nuclear technology, and 
unreasonable declarations of politicians led to sanctions and consequently economic 
problem for the regime and people. Financial problem of people followed by the police 
forces to suppress any opposing voices. Then, being fearful, people mostly preferred to 
care more about the financial problems and the difficulty of living than criticizing 
policies of the regime. In such a horror and suffocating situation dictator regimes are 
able to rule in name of democracy.  
 Considering the conservative policies of the IRI and disappointment of people to have 
constructive reforms, we see the importance of the Human Rights Organizations and 
International community’s –in spite of some deficiencies argued before –to help the 
oppositions achieve their peaceful and democratic goals.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
In the Analysis and Discussion chapters we referred to the concepts of democracy, good 
governance, citizenship, cultural relativism, deconstruction, etc. to provide both sides of 
the argument: from human rights activists’ perspective and from IRI’s stance. Although 
‘the human rights values’ has turned to be a glamorous gift of globalization for all 
human beings, the authorities and clergymen of the IRI mostly reject or ignore the 
adaptation and implementation of these values. The IRI’s policies –because of its 
religious-political system known as theocracy– are in sharp contrast with the activities 
of the Human Rights Organizations, and in spite of the IRI awareness of the Human 
Rights’ importance in international relations and their roles in gaining international 
respect for the regime, the regime’s authorities have questioned the authenticity of 
human rights’ values –a Western product that is not based on celestial values but 
secular ones. However, for not being regarded as a sample of bad government the IRI 
has adapted the values that might not affect the structural norms of the Islamic 
governance, although these might not be thoroughly implemented. 
Cultural relativism emphasizes on considering the human rights values based on the 
realities of the societies; we suppose this argument could be considerable if the IRI 
didn’t have an autocratic system. The regime since taking the power began to 
reconstruct the social, cultural and political values and realities of Iranians based on the 
religious and Revolution’s values. The conservative homogenization policy of the 
regime marginalized the minorities and suffocated the voices of the oppositions . 
However, the spokesmen of the regime claim that they protect the people’s cultural 
values and realities from the Western soft invasion by forcing the secular human rights 
values. What we conclude is that the regime is trying to keep its cultural and political 
product-values by spreading the pessimistic view on the global human rights values. 
The IRI’s ignorance of the human rights values, which are now the demand of majority 
of the Iranians, has cause decline of the regime’s internal and international legitimacies. 
Thanks to globalization and communicating technology, people are now familiar w ith 
different forms of citizenships. They compare their social and political situations with 
the individuals’ in the developed societies. People, now a day, mostly seek a type of 
citizenship that can provide them a context in which they can pursue their dr eams 
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based on their free wills, talents and attempts. Tendency of Iranians to the global 
democratic values with equal individual rights might be the nightmare of the regime, 
because the IRI regard the human rights activities as propaganda against the 
constructed edifice of the regime. Therefore, since the regime cannot resist the 
stimulations of human rights, it develops horror and uses force to control the people’s 
secular tendencies and the expression of them.  
In spite of the many advantages of the Human Rights activities, there are some doubts 
that break the holiness of the global human rights. The main issue we pointed to, in 
Analysis and Discussion is the advocacy of human rights by super powers in a way that 
it is used as a tool to penetrate the social and political structures of less-democratic 
countries –or better to say developing countries. In this regards by weakening of states 
and increasing the individual’s freedom, literally, the individuals are decolonized from 
the absolute control of government while the states neo-colonized by the superpowers. 
Therefore, it is not just the rights’ values itself in general that is problematic but the 
impacts they will leave on the edifice of the state’s authority. 
 
Perspective  
In this perspective we present an interesting subject for possible further projects. We 
propose the subject ‘the Iranian civil society and its relation to IRI’. Generally civil 
society has consisted of: Community based organizations (CBOs) and Non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). These organizations are a rich source of knowledge and 
experience in many areas. Improving and providing equal rights for the women, 
community members and minorities generally are subject to the civil society activities.  
Civil society does a great contribution to the formation of the government’s policy –
particularly in democratic states –in those above mentioned areas. The existence of a 
strong civil society facilitates a wide degree of transparency and rights of equality, which 
can result in the welfare of its society; otherwise its decline means the decline of a 
society’s well being.  
 Particularly, civil society’s activity will take place in areas where the state has not acted, 
or has acted opposite to the people’s demands. In non-democratic states civil society has 
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often emerge as a safeguard instrument against tyranny and injustice. Furthermore, civil 
society works as a locomotive for transforming and forcing a society into democracy and 
control of the political power, and transition from a weak civil society to a strong and 
sustainable one. 
In our project we realized that the IRI in many areas violates the rights of its citizens, 
therefore we thought to study the relationship between the state and the civil society is 
also an interesting subject.  The Iranian civil society in realizing its role –also developing 
and establishing democracy and civil rights movement in Iran –must has a defined 
strategy and plan of action, otherwise it will become a follower of other strategies. But, 
what are the challenges of Iranian civil society and how it –in the political system of IRI–
can interact and cooperate with the government is a great challenge.  
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